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The Elasticity of Taxable Income
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates:
A Critical Review
Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz*
This paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity
of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data. First, we
provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can
be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis. We discuss what
other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic.
Second, we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation
of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income
tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues. Third, we provide a
critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income
in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out. Finally, we discuss
avenues for future research. ( JEL H24, H31, J22)

1.

respect to the marginal tax rate. Indeed, until
recently, the labor supply elasticity was the
closest thing that public finance economics
had to a central parameter. In a static model
where people value only two commodities—
leisure and a composite consumption good—
the real wage in terms of the consumption
good is the only relative price at issue. This
real wage is equal to the amount of goods
that can be consumed per hour of leisure
foregone (or, equivalently, per hour of labor
supplied). At the margin, substitution possibilities, and therefore the excess burden of
taxation, can be captured by a compensated
labor supply elasticity.
With some notable exceptions, the profession has settled on a value for this elasticity
close to zero for prime-age males, although
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T

he notion of a behavioral elasticity occupies a critical place in the economic analysis of taxation. Graduate textbooks teach
that the two central aspects of the public
sector, optimal progressivity of the tax-andtransfer system, as well as the optimal size of
the public sector, depend (inversely) on the
compensated elasticity of labor supply with
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for married women the responsiveness of
labor force participation appears to be significant. Overall, though, the compensated
elasticity of labor appears to be fairly small.
In models with only a labor–leisure choice,
this implies that the efficiency cost per dollar
raised of taxing labor income—to redistribute revenue to others or to provide public
goods—is bound to be low, as well.
Although evidence of a substantial compensated labor supply elasticity has been
hard to find, evidence that taxpayers respond
to tax system changes more generally has
decidedly not been hard to find. For example, the timing of capital gains realizations
appears to react strongly to changes in capital gains tax rates, as evidenced by the surge
in capital gains realizations in 1986, after the
United States announced increased tax rates
on realizations beginning in 1987 (Auerbach
1988). Dropping the top individual tax rate
to below the corporate tax rate in the same
act led to a significant shift in business activity toward pass-through entities, which are
not subject to the corporate tax (Auerbach
and Slemrod 1997).
Addressing these other margins of behavioral response is crucial because, under some
assumptions, all responses to taxation are
symptomatic of deadweight loss. Taxes trigger a host of behavioral responses intended
to minimize the burden on the individual. In
the absence of externalities or other market
failure, and putting aside income effects, all
such responses are sources of inefficiency,
whether they take the form of reduced labor
supply, increased charitable contributions
or mortgage interest payments, increased
expenditures for tax professionals, or a different form of business organization, and
thus they add to the burden of taxes from
society’s perspective. Because in principle
the elasticity of taxable income (which we
abbreviate from now on using the standard acronym ETI) can capture all of these
responses, it holds the promise of more
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accurately summarizing the marginal efficiency cost of taxation than a narrower measure of taxpayer response such as the labor
supply elasticity, and therefore is a worthy
topic of investigation.
Although the literature reviewed in this
article addresses the behavioral response
to individual income taxation, many of the
issues apply to any tax base. Certainly the idea
that, under some assumptions, all responses
are symptoms of inefficiency applies generally. For example, consider a state imposing
a cigarette excise tax. Under some assumptions, the central empirical parameter is the
elasticity of the cigarette tax base, which
includes not only the response of smoking to
tax rate changes but also the impact on the
tax base of smuggling and tax-free Internet
purchases.
The new focus (on the ETI) raises the
possibility that the efficiency cost of taxation is significantly higher than is implied if
labor supply is the sole, or principal, margin of behavioral response. Indeed, some
of the first empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable income implied very sizable
responses and therefore a very high marginal
efficiency cost of funds. However, the subsequent literature found substantially smaller
elasticities, and raised questions about both
our ability to identify this key parameter and
about the claim that it alone is a sufficient
statistic for welfare analysis of the tax system. Whether the taxable income elasticity
is an accurate indicator of the revenue leakage due to behavioral response, the ultimate
indicator of efficiency cost, depends on the
situation. First, if revenue leakage in current year tax revenue is substantially offset
by revenue gain in other years or in other tax
bases, it is misleading. Second, if some of the
response involves changes in activities with
externalities, such as charitable giving behavior, then the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis. Third, the elasticity
depends on the tax system. A tax system with
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a narrow base and many deductions and
avoidance opportunities is likely to generate
high elasticities and hence large efficiency
costs. In that context, broadening the tax
base and eliminating avoidance opportunities such as to reduce the elasticity is likely
to be more efficient and more equitable than
altering tax rates within the old system.
The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework underlying the taxable income
elasticity concept. Section 3 presents the key
identification issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the taxable income elasticity, using as an illustration the taxable income
response to the 1993 top tax rate increase
in the United States. Section 4 reviews the
results of some selected empirical studies in
light of our discussion of the conceptual and
empirical issues. Section 5 concludes and
discusses the most promising avenues for
future research. Appendices present a summary of the key U.S. legislated tax changes
that have been studied in the U.S. literature
and a brief description of existing U.S. tax
return data.
2.

Conceptual Framework

2.1 Basic Model
In the standard labor supply model, individuals maximize a utility function u(c, l)
where c is disposable income, equal to consumption in a one-period model, and l is
labor supply measured by hours of work.
Earnings are given by w · l, where w is the
exogenous wage rate. The (linearized) budget constraint is c = w · l · (1 − τ) + E,
where τ is the marginal tax rate and E is virtual income.
The taxable income elasticity literature
generalizes this model by noting that hours
of work are only one component of the
behavioral response to income taxation.
Individuals can respond to taxation through
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other 
margins such as intensity of work,
career choices, form and timing of compensation, tax avoidance, or tax evasion. As
a result, an individual’s wage rate w might
depend on effort and respond to tax rates,
and reported taxable income might differ
from w · l as individuals split their gross
earnings between taxable cash compensation
and nontaxable compensation such as fringe
benefits, or even fail to report their full taxable income because of tax evasion.
As shown by Feldstein (1999), a simple
way to model all those behavioral responses
is to posit that utility depends positively
on disposable income (equal to consumption) c and negatively on reported income z
(because activities that generate income are
costly, for example because they may require
foregoing leisure). Hence, individuals choose
(c, z) to maximize a utility function u(c, z)
subject to a budget constraint of the form
c = (1 − τ) · z + E. Such maximization
generates an individual “reported income”
supply function z(1 − τ, E) where z depends
on the net-of-marginal-tax rate 1 − τ and
virtual income E generated by the tax/transfer system.1 Each individual has a particular
reported income supply function reflecting
his/her skills, taste for labor, opportunities
for avoidance, and so on.2
In most of what follows, we assume away
income effects so that the income function z does not depend on E and depends

1 This reported income supply function remains valid in
the case of nonlinear tax schedules as c = (1 − τ)z + E is
the linearized budget constraint at the utility-maximizing
point, just as in the basic labor supply model.
2  We could have posited a more general model in
which c = y − τ z + E, where y is real income and z is
reported income that may differ from real income because
of, for example, tax evasion and avoidance. Utility would
be u(c, y, y − z) which is increasing in c, decreasing in y
(earnings effort), and decreasing in y − z (costs of avoiding or evading taxes). Such a utility function would still
generate a reported income supply function of the form
z(1 − τ, E) and our analysis would go through. We come
back to such a more general model in section 2.4.
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only on the net-of-tax rate.3 In the absence
of compelling evidence about significant
income effects in the case of overall reported
income, it seems reasonable to consider the
case with no income effects, which simplifies considerably the presentation of efficiency effects. It might seem unintuitive to
assume away the effect of changes in exogenous income on (reported taxable) income.
However, in the reported income context, E
is defined exclusively as virtual income created by the tax/transfer budget constraint
and hence is not part of taxable income z.
Another difference is that the labor component of z is labor income (w · l) rather than
labor hours (l); this difference requires us
to address the incidence of tax rate changes
(i.e., their effect on w), which we do briefly
in section 2.2.5.
The ETI literature has attempted to estimate the elasticity of reported incomes with
respect to the net-of-tax rate, defined as
(1)

1 −  
τ ·  _
∂ z    ,
e =  _
z
∂ (1 − τ)

the percent change in reported income
when the net-of-tax rate increases by 1 percent. With no income effects, this elasticity is
equal to both the compensated and uncompensated elasticity. Importantly, and as recognized in the labor supply literature, the
elasticity for a given individual may not be
constant and depends on the tax system. As a
result, an elasticity estimated around the current tax system may not apply to a hypothetical large tax change. As shown in Feldstein

3

There is no consensus in the labor supply literature
about the size of income effects, with many studies obtaining small income effects, but with several important studies
finding large income effects (see Blundell and MaCurdy
1999 for a survey). There is much less empirical evidence
on the magnitude of income effects in the reported income
literature. Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate both income
and substitution effects in the case of reported incomes,
and find small and insignificant income effects.
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(1999), this elasticity captures not only the
hours of work response, but also all other
behavioral responses to marginal tax rates.
Furthermore, it depends on features of the
tax system, such as the availability of deductions, and other avoidance opportunities—a
very important point for the interpretation
of empirical results, as we discuss below.
Therefore, the elasticity is not a structural
parameter depending solely on individual
preferences.
As we discuss later, a number of empirical studies have found that the behavioral
response to changes in marginal tax rates
is concentrated in the top of the income
distribution, with less evidence of any
response for the middle and upper-middle
income class (see sections 3 and 4 below).4
Moreover, in the United States, because of
graduated rates as well as exemptions and
low-income tax credits, individual income tax
liabilities are very skewed: the top quintile
(top percentile) tax filers remitted 86.3 percent (39.1 percent) of all individual income
taxes in 2006 (Congressional Budget Office
2009). Therefore, it is useful to focus on the
analysis of the effects of changing the marginal tax rate on the upper end of the income
distribution. Let us therefore assume that
incomes in the top bracket, above a given
_
reported income threshold z
 , face a constant
5
marginal tax rate τ.
As in the conceptual framework just
described, we assume that individual incomes
reported in the top bracket depend on the
net-of-tax rate 1 − τ. Let us assume that there
_
are N individuals in the top bracket (above z
)
4 The behavioral response at the low end of the income
distribution is for the most part out of the scope of the present paper. The large literature on responses to welfare and
income transfer programs targeted toward low incomes
has, however, displayed evidence of significant labor supply
responses (see, e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).
5 For example, in the case of tax year 2008 federal
income
tax law in the United States, taxable incomes above
_
z  = $357,700 are taxed at the top marginal tax rate of
τ = 0.35.
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when the top bracket rate is τ. We denote
by zm(1 − τ) the average income reported by
those N top taxpayers, as a function of the
net-of-tax rate. The aggregate elasticity of taxable income in the top bracket with respect
to the net-of-tax rate is therefore defined
 /∂ (1 − τ)]. This
as e = [(1 − τ)/zm] · [∂ zm
aggregate elasticity is equal to the average of
the individual elasticities weighted by individual income, so that individuals contribute
to the aggregate elasticity in proportion to
their incomes.6
Suppose that the government increases
the top tax rate τ by a small amount d  τ
(with no change in the tax schedule for
_
incomes below z
 ). This small tax reform has
two effects on tax revenue. First, there is a
“mechanical” increase in tax revenue due to
the fact that taxpayers face a higher tax rate
_
on their incomes above z
 . The total mechanical effect is
(2)

_

dM ≡ N · (zm
   − z) · d  τ > 0.

This mechanical effect is the projected
increase in tax revenue, absent any behavioral response.
Second, the increase in the tax rate triggers
a behavioral response that reduces the average reported income of top N taxpayers by
d  zm  = −e · zm  · dτ/(1 − τ).7 A change in
reported income of dzm changes tax revenue
by τ d  zm. Hence, the aggregate change in tax

6 Formally, z
m
 =

[z1 + . . + zN]/N and hence
m
e = [(1 − τ)/z ] · [∂ z /∂ (1 − τ)]
= (1 − τ) · [∂ z1 /∂ (1 − τ) + . . + ∂ zN/∂ (1 − τ)]/[N · zm
 ]
= [e1· z1+ . . + eN · zN ]/[z1+ . . + zN ],
where eiis the elasticity of individual i.
7 The change d  τ could induce a small fraction d  N of the
N taxpayers to leave (or join if d  τ < 0) the top bracket.
As long as behavioral responses take place only along the
intensive margin, each individual response is proportional
to d  τ so that the total revenue effect of such responses is
second order (d  N · d  τ) and hence can be ignored in our
derivation.
m

01_Saez.indd 7

7

revenue due to the behavioral response is
equal to
(3)

τ   . d τ < 0.
dB ≡ −N · e · zm  ·  _
1−τ

Summing the mechanical and the behavioral
effect, we obtain the total change in tax revenue due to the tax change:
(4) dR = dM + dB

_

= N · (zm
   − z)

[

]

zm
  _   ·  _
τ  · d  τ.
· 1 − e ·  _
m
z   − z 1 − τ
_

   − z).
Let us denote by a the ratio z m/(zm
Note that in general a ≥ 1, and that a = 1
when a single flat tax rate applies to all
incomes, as in this case the top bracket starts
_
at zero (z  = 0). If the top tail of the distribution is Pareto distributed,8 then the parame_
ter a does not vary with z and is exactly equal
to the Pareto parameter. As the tails of actual
income distributions are very well approximated by Pareto distributions, within a given
year, the coefficient a is extremely stable in
_
the United States for z above $300,000 and
equals approximately 1.5 in recent years.9
The parameter a measures the thinness of
the top tail of the income distribution: the

8 A Pareto distribution has a density function of the form
f (z) = C/z1+α, where C and α are constant parameters.
The parameter α is called the Pareto parameter.
In that
_
case, zm
 = ∫
_z∞
    z  · f_(z)· dz/∫_z ∞
     f  (z) · dz = z  · α/(α − 1)
m
and hence z m
 /(z   − z) = α.
9 Saez (2001) provides such an empirical analysis for
1992 and 1993 reported wage incomes using U.S. tax
return data. Piketty
and Saez (2003) provide estimates
_
of thresholds z and average incomes z m corresponding to
various fractiles within the top decile of the U.S. income
distribution from 1913 to 2008, allowing a straightforward
estimation of the parameter a for any year and income
threshold. As U.S. income concentration has increased in
recent decades, the Pareto parameter a has correspondingly fallen from about 2 in the 1970s to about 1.5 in most
recent years.
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thicker the tail of the distribution, the larger
_
 , and hence the smaller is a.
is zm
  relative to z
Using the definition of a, we can rewrite
the effect of the small reform on tax revenue
dR simply as:
(5)

[

]

τ   · e · a .
dR = dM · 1 −  _
1−τ

Formula (5) shows that the fraction of tax
revenue lost through behavioral responses—
the second term in the square bracket
expression—is a simple function increasing in the tax rate τ, the elasticity e, and the
Pareto parameter a. This expression is of primary importance to the welfare analysis of
taxation because τ · e · a/(1 − τ) is exactly
equal to the marginal deadweight burden
created by the increase in the tax rate, under
the assumptions we have made and that we
discuss below. This can be seen as follows:
Because of the envelope theorem, the behavioral response to a small tax change dτ creates no additional welfare loss and thus the
utility loss (measured in dollar terms) created by the tax increase is exactly equal to the
mechanical effect dM.10 However, tax revenue collected is only dR = dM + dB < dM
because dB < 0. Thus −dB represents the
extra amount lost in utility over and above
the tax revenue collected dR. From (5) and
because dR = dM + dB, the marginal excess
burden per dollar of extra taxes collected is
defined as
(6)

e·a·τ
  
  
.
− dB/dR =  __
1−τ−e·a·τ

In other words, for each extra dollar of taxes
raised, the government imposes an extra
10 Formally, V(1 − τ, E) = max u(z(1 − τ) + E, z) so
z
_
that d V = uc · (−zdτ + dE) = −uc · (z − z
 ) d τ. Therefore, the (money-metric) marginal utility cost of the reform
is indeed equal to the mechanical tax increase, individual
by individual.
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cost equal to −dB/dR > 0 on 
taxpayers.
We can also define the “marginal efficiency
cost of funds’’ (MECF) as 1 − dB/dR
= (1 − τ)/(1 − τ − e · a ·τ). These formulas are valid for any tax rate τ and income
distribution as long as income effects are
assumed away, even if individuals have heterogeneous utility functions and behavioral
elasticities.11 The parameters τ and a are
relatively straightforward to measure, so
that the elasticity parameter e is the central
parameter necessary to calculate formulas
(5) and (6). Marginal deadweight burden
or marginal efficiency cost of funds measure solely efficiency costs and abstract from
distributional considerations. The optimal
income tax progressivity literature precisely
brings together the efficiency formulas
derived here with welfare weights capturing distributional concerns. Therefore, the
behavioral response elasticity is also a key
parameter for characterizing optimal progressivity (Saez 2001).
To illustrate these formulas, consider the
following example using U.S. data. In recent
years, for the top 1 percent income cut-off
(corresponding approximately to the top 35
percent federal income tax bracket in that
year), Piketty and Saez (2003) estimate that
a = 1.5. When combining the maximum
federal and average state income, Medicare,
and typical sales tax rates in the United
States, the top marginal tax rate for ordinary
income is 42.5 percent as of 2009.12 For an
11  In contrast, the Harberger triangle (Harberger
1964) approximations are valid only for small tax rates.
This expression also abstracts from any marginal compliance costs caused by raising rates, and from any marginal
administrative costs unless dR is interpreted as revenue net
of administrative costs. See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
12 A top federal tax rate of 35 percent, combined with
an average top state income tax rate of 5.9 percent, the
Medicare 2.9 percent payroll tax, and an average sales tax
rate of 2.3 percent generate a total top marginal tax rate of
42.5 percent, when considering that state income taxes are
deductible when calculating federal income taxes and the
employer’s share of the Medicare tax is deductible for both
state and federal income tax calculations.
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elasticity estimate of e = 0.25 (corresponding, as we discuss later, to the mid-range of
the estimates from the literature), the fraction of tax revenue lost through behavioral
responses (−dB/dM), should the top tax rate
be slightly increased, would be 27.7 percent,
slightly above a quarter of the mechanical
(i.e., ignoring behavioral responses) projected increase in tax revenue. In terms of
marginal excess burden, increasing tax revenue by dR = $1 causes a utility loss (equal
to the MECF) of 1/(1 − 0.277) = $1.38 for
taxpayers, and hence a marginal excess burden of −dB/dR = $0.38, or 38 percent of
the extra $1 tax collected.
Following the supply-side debates of
the early 1980s, much attention has been
focused on the revenue-maximizing tax rate.
The revenue-maximizing tax rate τ* is such
that the bracketed expression in equation (5)
is exactly zero when τ = τ*. Rearranging this
equation, we obtain the following simple formula for the revenue-maximizing tax rate τ*
for the top bracket:
(7)

1
τ* =  _
 .
1 + a·e

A top tax rate above τ* is inefficient because
decreasing the tax rate would both increase
the utility of the affected taxpayers with
_
income above z and increase government
revenue, which could in principle be used
to benefit other taxpayers.13 The optimal
income taxation literature following Mirrlees
(1971) shows that formula (7) is the optimal top tax rate if the social marginal utility of consumption decreases to zero when
income is large (see Saez 2001). At the
urden
tax rate τ*, the marginal excess b
13 Formally, this a second-best Pareto-inefficient outcome as there is a feasible government policy that can produce a Pareto improvement, ignoring the possibility that
the utility of some individuals enters negatively in the utility functions of others.
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becomes infinite as 
raising more tax revenue becomes impossible. Using our previous example with e = 0.25 and a = 1.5,
the revenue-maximizing tax rate τ* would
be 72.7 percent, much higher than the current U.S. top tax rate of 42.5 percent when
combining all taxes. Keeping state income
and sales taxes, and Medicare taxes constant, this would correspond to a top federal
individual income tax rate of 68.4 percent,
very substantially higher than the current
35 percent but lower than the top federal
income tax rate prior to 1982.
Note that when the tax system has a single
_
tax rate (i.e., when z  = 0), the tax-revenuemaximizing rate becomes the well-known
expression τ* = 1/(1 + e). As a ≥ 1, the
revenue-maximizing flat rate is always larger
than the revenue-maximizing rate applied to
high incomes only. This is because increasing
just the top tax rate collects extra taxes only
on the portion of incomes above the bracket
_
threshold z
, but produces a behavioral
response for high-income taxpayers as large
as an identical across-the-board increase in
marginal tax rates.
Giertz (2009) applies the formulas presented in this section to tax return data
from published Statistics of Income tables
produced by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to analyze the impact of the potential
expiration of the Bush administration tax
cuts in 2011. Giertz shows that exactly where
the ETI falls within the range found in the
empirical literature has significant effects
on the efficiency and revenue implications
for tax policy. For example, Giertz reports
that for ETIs of 0.2, 0.5, and 1.0, behavioral responses would respectively erase 12,
31, and 62 percent of the mechanical revenue gain. When offsets to payroll and state
income taxes are taken into account, these
numbers increase by 28 percent. Likewise,
estimates for the marginal cost of public
funds and the revenue-maximizing rates are
quite sensitive to this range of ETIs.
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In the basic model we have considered, the
ETI e is a sufficient statistic to estimate the
efficiency costs of taxation as it is not necessary to estimate the structural parameters of
the underlying individual preferences. Such
sufficient statistics for welfare and normative
analysis have been used in various contexts
in the field of public economics in recent
years (see Chetty 2009c for a recent survey).
However, it is important to understand the
limitations of this approach and the strong
assumptions required to apply it, as we show
in the next subsections.
2.2 Fiscal Externalities and Income Shifting
The analysis has assumed so far that the
reduction in reported incomes due to a tax
rate increase has no other effect on tax revenue. This is a reasonable assumption if
the reduction in incomes is due to reduced
labor supply (and hence an increase in
untaxed leisure time), or due to a shift from
taxable cash compensation toward untaxed
fringe benefits or perquisites (more generous health insurance, better offices, company cars, etc.) or tax evasion. However, in
many instances the reduction in reported
incomes is due in part to a shift away from
taxable individual income toward other
forms of taxable income such as corporate
income, or deferred compensation that will
be taxable to the individual at a later date
(see Slemrod 1998). For example, Slemrod
(1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000)
argue that part of the surge in top individual
incomes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986
in the United States, which reduced individual income tax rates relative to corporate
tax rates (see appendix A), was due to a shift
of taxable income from the corporate sector
toward the individual sector.
For a tax change in a given base z, we
define a fiscal externality as a change in the
present value of tax revenue that occurs in
any tax base z′ other than z due to the behavioral response of private agents to the tax

01_Saez.indd 10

change in the initial base z. The alternative
tax base z′ can be a different tax base in the
same time period or the same tax base in a
different time period. The notion of fiscal
externality is therefore dependent on the
scope of the analysis both along the base
dimension and the time dimension. In the
limit, where the analysis encompasses all
tax bases and all time periods (and hence
focuses on the total present discounted value
of total tax revenue), there can by definition
be no fiscal externalities.
To see the implication of income shifting,
assume that a fraction s < 1 of the income
that disappears from the individual income
tax base following the tax rate increase dτ is
shifted to other bases and is taxed on average
at rate t. For example, if half of the reduction in individual reported incomes is due to
increased (untaxed) leisure and half is due
to a shift toward the corporate sector, then
s = 1/2 and t would be equal to the effective
tax rate on corporate income.14 In the general
case, a behavioral response dz now generates
a tax revenue change equal to (τ − s · t) · dz.
As a result, the change in tax revenue due to
the behavioral response becomes:
(8)

τ   · dτ
dB = −N · e · zm  ·  _
1−τ
s · t   · dτ.
+ N · e · zm  ·  _
1−τ

Therefore, formula (5) for the effect of a
small reform on total tax revenue becomes:
(9) dR = dM + dB

[

]

τ − s · t   · e · a .
= dM · 1 −  _
1−τ

14 It is possible to have t > τ, for example if there
are (nontax) advantages to the corporate form. If all the
response is shifting (s = 1), dτ > 0 would actually then
lead to behavioral responses increasing total tax revenue
and hence reducing deadweight burden.
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The same envelope theorem logic applies for
welfare analysis: the income that is shifted
to another tax base at the margin does
not generate any direct change in welfare
because the taxpayer is indifferent between
reporting marginal income in the individual
income tax base versus the alternative tax
base. Therefore, as above, −dB represents
the marginal deadweight burden of the individual income tax, and the marginal excess
burden expressed in terms of extra taxes collected can be written as
e · a · (τ − s · t)
dB   =  __
  
     .
(10) −  _
1
−
τ − e · a · (τ − s · t)
dR
The revenue-maximizing tax rate (7)
becomes:
1 + s·t·a·e
  
  
   > τ*.
(11)  
τ  *s   =  __
1+ a·e

If we assume again that a = 1.5, e = 0.25,
τ = 0.425, but that half (s = 0.5) of marginal
income disappearing from the individual base
is taxed on average at t = 0.3,15 the fraction
of revenue lost due to behavioral responses
drops from 27.7 percent to 17.9 percent, and
the marginal excess burden (expressed as a
percentage of extra taxes raised) decreases
from 38 percent to 22 percent. The revenuemaximizing tax rate increases from 72.7 percent to 76.8 percent.
This simple theoretical analysis shows
therefore that, in addition to estimating the
elasticity e, it is critical to analyze whether
the source or destination of changes in
reported individual incomes is another tax
base, either a concurrent one or in another
time period. Thus two additional parameters, in addition to the taxable income elasticity e, are crucial in the estimation of the
tax revenue effects and marginal deadweight
15 We show below that s = 0.5 and t = 0.3 are realistic
numbers to capture the shift from corporate to individual
taxable income following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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burden: (1) the extent to which individual
income changes in the first tax base z shift
to another form of income that is taxable,
characterized by parameter s, and (2) the tax
rate t at which the income shifted is taxed.
In practice, there are many possibilities for
such shifting and measuring empirically all
the shifting effects is challenging, especially
in the case of shifting across time. The recent
literature has addressed several channels for
such fiscal externalities. Alternatively, one
could identify shifting by looking directly at
the overall revenue from all sources.
2.2.1 Individual versus Corporate Income
Tax Base
Most countries tax corporate profits
with a separate corpor    
ate income tax.16
Unincorporated business profits (such as
sole proprietorships or partnerships) are in
general taxed directly at the individual level.
In the United States, closely held corporations with few shareholders (less than 100
currently) can elect to become Subchapter S
corporations and be taxed solely at the individual level. Such businesses are also called
pass-through entities. Therefore, the choice
of business organization (regular corporation
taxed by the corporate income tax versus
pass-through entity taxed solely at the individual level) might respond to the relative tax
rates on corporate versus individual income.
For example, if the individual income tax
rate increases, some businesses taxed at the
16 Net-of-tax corporate profits are generally taxed
again at the individual level when paid out as dividends
to individual shareholders. Many OECD countries alleviate such double taxation of corporate profits by providing
tax credits or preferential tax treatment for dividends. If
profits are retained in the corporation, they increase the
value of the company stock and those profits may, as in the
United States, be taxed as realized capital gains when the
individual owners eventually sell the stock. In general, the
individual level of taxation of corporate profits is lower than
the ordinary individual tax on unincorporated businesses
so that the combined tax on corporate profits and distributed profits may be lower than the direct individual tax for
individuals subject to high marginal individual tax rates.
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individual level may choose to incorporate
where they would be subjected to the corporate income tax instead.17 In that case,
the standard taxable income elasticity might
be large and the individual income tax revenue consequences significant. However,
corporate income tax revenue will increase
and partially offset the loss in revenue on
the individual side. It is possible to provide
a micro-founded model capturing those
effects.18 If businesses face heterogeneous
costs of switching organizational form (representing both transaction costs and nontax
considerations) and the aggregate shifting
response to tax rate changes is smooth, then
marginal welfare analysis would still be applicable. As a result, formula (9) is a sufficient
statistic to derive the welfare costs of taxation
in that case.19 Estimating s and t empirically
would require knowing the imputed corporate profits of individual shareholders.
This issue was quite significant for analyses of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 because of
the sharp decline (and change in sign!) in the
difference between the top personal and corporate tax rates, which created an incentive
to shift business income from the corporation tax base to pass-through entities such as
partnerships or Subchapter S corporations,
so that the business income shows up in the
individual income tax base (see appendix A
for a description of the 1986 tax reform).
This phenomenon was indeed widespread
immediately after the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (documented by Slemrod 1996, Robert

17 Again, to the extent that dividends and capital gains
are taxed, shareholders would not entirely escape the individual income tax.
18 Alvaredo and Saez (2009) develop such a model in
the case of the Spanish wealth tax, under which stock in
closely held companies is excluded from the wealth tax for
individuals who own at least 15 percent of the business and
are substantially involved in management.
19 It is a reduced-form formula because a change in the
rules about business organization would in general change
the behavioral elasticity.
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Carroll and David Joulfaian 1997, and Saez
2004b among others).
2.2.2 Timing Responses
If individuals anticipate that a tax increase
will happen soon, such as when President
Clinton was elected in late 1992 on a program to raise top individual tax rates, which
was indeed implemented in 1993, they have
incentives to accelerate taxable income realizations before the tax change takes place.20
As a result, reported taxable income just after
the reform will be lower than otherwise. In
that case, the tax increase has a positive fiscal externality on the pre-reform period that
ought to be taken into account in a welfare
analysis.
As we will see below, this issue of retiming is particularly important in the case
of realized capital gains21 and stock-option
exercises (Goolsbee 2000b) because individuals can easily time the realization of such
income. Parcell (1995) and Sammartino and
Weiner (1997) document the large shift of
taxable income into 1992 from 1993 (even
when excluding capital gains) in response
to the tax increase on high-income earners
promised by President-elect Bill Clinton,
and enacted in early 1993.
The labor supply literature started with
a static framework and then developed a
dynamic framework with intertemporal substitution to distinguish between responses
to temporary versus permanent changes in
wage rates (MaCurdy 1981). In this framework, differential responses arise because,
and only because, the income effects of
temporary versus permanent changes

20 Anticipated tax decreases would have the opposite
effect.
21 A well-known example is the U.S. Tax Reform Act of
1986, which increased the top tax rate on realized longterm capital gains from 20 percent to 28 percent beginning
in 1987, and generated a surge in capital gains realizations
at the end of 1986 (Auerbach 1988; Burman, Clausing, and
O’Hare 1994).
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differ.22 The ETI literature has focused
on a simpler framework (usually) with no
income effects and within which intertemporal issues cannot be modeled adequately.
This is an important issue to keep in mind
when evaluating existing empirical studies
of the ETI; future research should develop
an intertemporal framework to account for
expected future tax rate changes, so as to
distinguish responses to temporarily high, or
low, tax rates. Such a dynamic framework has
been developed for specific components of
taxable income such as realized capital gains
(Burman and Randolph 1994) and charitable
contributions (Bakija and Heim 2008).
If current income tax rates increase, but
long-term future expected income tax rates
do not, individuals might decide to defer
some of their incomes, for example, in the
form of future pension payments23 (deferred
compensation) or future realized capital
gains.24 In that case, a current tax increase
might have a positive fiscal externality in
future years; such a fiscal externality affects
the welfare cost of taxation as we described
above. A similar issue applies whenever a
change in tax rates affects business investment decisions undertaken by individuals.
If, for example, a lower tax rate induces sole
proprietors or principals in pass-through
entities to expand investment, the short-term
effect on taxable income may be n
 egative,
reflecting the deductible net expenses in the
early years of an investment project.
22   In the labor supply literature, responses to temporary wage rate changes are captured by the Frisch elasticity, which is higher than the compensated elasticity with
respect to permanent changes.
23 In the United States, individual workers can electively set aside a fraction of their earnings into pension
plans (traditional IRAs and 401(k)s) or employers can provide increased retirement contributions at the expense of
current compensation. In both cases, those pension contributions are taxed as income when the money is withdrawn.
24 For example, companies, on behalf of their shareholders, may decide to reduce current dividend payments
and retain earnings that generate capital gains that are
taxed later when the stock is sold.
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As already noted, the ETI and MDWL
concepts are relevant for the optimal design
of the tax and transfer system, because they
increase the economic cost of the higher marginal tax rates needed to effect redistribution. Importantly, though, they do not enter
directly into an evaluation of deficit-financed
tax cuts (or deficit-reducing tax increases).
This is because, with a fixed time pattern of
government expenditure, tax cuts now must
eventually be offset by tax increases later.
Ignoring the effects of one period’s tax rate
on other periods’ taxable income, if the ETI
is relatively large a current tax cut will cause
a relatively large increase in current taxable
income. Offsetting this, however, is the fact
that when the offsetting tax increases occur
later, the high ETI (and there is no reason
to think it will go up or down over time)
will generate relatively big decreases in taxable income at that time. Accounting for the
intertemporal responses, both of the real and
income-shifting variety, to time-varying tax
rate changes suggests that a deficit-financed
tax cut that, by definition, collects no revenue
in present value will cause deadweight loss
by distorting the timing of taxable income
flows.
2.2.3 Long-Term Responses
One might expect short-term tax responses
to be larger than longer-term responses
because people may be able to easily shift
income between adjacent years without altering real behavior. However, adjusting to a tax
change might take time (as individuals might
decide to change their career or educational
choices or businesses might change their
long-term investment decisions) and thus
the relative magnitude of the two responses
is theoretically ambiguous. The long-term
response is of most interest for policy making although, as we discuss below, the longterm response is more difficult to identify
empirically. The empirical literature has primarily focused on short-term (one year) and
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medium-term (up to five year) responses,
and is not able to convincingly identify very
long-term responses.
The issue of long-term responses is particularly important in the case of capital
income, as capital income is the consequence
of past savings and investment decisions.
For example, a higher top income tax rate
might discourage wealth accumulation or
contribute to the dissipation of existing fortunes faster. Conversely, reductions in this
rate might trigger an increase in the growth
rate of capital income for high-income individuals. The new long-term wealth distribution equilibrium might not be reached for
decades or even generations, which makes it
particularly difficult to estimate. Estimating
the effects on capital accumulation would
require developing a dynamic model of tax
responses, which has not yet been developed
in the context of the ETI literature. This
would be a promising way to connect the
ETI literature to the macroeconomic literature on savings behavior.
2.2.4 Tax Evasion
Suppose that a tax increase leads to a
higher level of tax evasion.25 In that case,
there might be increases in taxes collected
on evading taxpayers following audits. This
increased audit-generated tax revenue is
another form of a positive fiscal externality.
In practice, most empirical studies are carried out using tax return data before audits
take place, and therefore do not fully capture
the revenue consequences. Chetty (2009b)
makes this point formally and shows that,
under risk neutrality assumptions, at the
margin the tax revenue lost due to increased
tax evasion is exactly recouped (in expectation) by increased tax revenue collected at
audit. As a result, in that case the elasticity
that matters for deadweight burden is not
25 Whether in theory one would expect this response is
not clear. See Yitzhaki (1974).
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the elasticity of reported income, but instead
the elasticity of actual income.
2.2.5 Other Fiscal Externalities
Changes in reported incomes might also
have consequences for bases other than federal income taxes. An obvious example is
the case of state income taxes in the United
States. If formula (6) is applied to the federal income tax only, it will not capture the
externality on state income tax revenue (as
states in general use almost the same income
tax base as the federal government). Thus
our original analysis should be based on the
combined federal and state income tax rates.
Changes in reported individual income due
to real changes in economic behavior (such
as reduced labor supply) can also have consequences for consumption taxes. In particular, a broad-based value added tax is
economically equivalent to an income tax
(with expensing) and therefore should also
be included in the tax rate used for welfare
computations.
Finally, fiscal externalities may also arise
due to classical general equilibrium tax incidence effects. For example, a reduced tax
rate on high incomes might stimulate labor
supply of workers in highly paid occupations, and hence could decrease their pretax wage rate while reducing labor supply
and thus increasing pretax wage rates of
lower-paid occupations.26 Such incidence
effects are effectively transfers from some
factors of production (high-skilled labor in
our example) to other factors of production
(low-skilled labor). If different factors are
taxed at different rates (due for example to
26 Such effects are extremely difficult to convincingly
estimate empirically. Kubik (2004) attempts such an analysis and finds that, controlling for occupation-specific time
trends in wage rates, individuals in occupations that experienced large decreases in their median marginal tax rates
due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 received lower pre-tax
wages after 1986 as the number of workers and the hours
worked in these professions increased.
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a progressive income tax), then those incidence effects will have fiscal consequences.
However, because those incidence effects
are transfers, in principle the government
can readjust tax rates on each factor to undo
those incidence effects at no fiscal cost.
Therefore, in a standard competitive model,
incidence effects do not matter for the efficiency analysis or for optimal tax design.27
2.3 Classical Externalities
There are situations where individual
responses to taxation may involve classical externalities. Two often mentioned
cases are charitable giving and mortgage
interest payments for residential housing,
which in the United States and some other
countries may be deductible from taxable
income, a tax treatment which is often justified on the grounds of classical externalities. Contributions to charitable causes
create positive externalities if contributions
increase the utility of the beneficiaries of the
nonprofit organizations. To the extent that
mortgage interest deductions increase home
ownership, they can arguably create positive externalities in neighborhoods. In both
cases, however, there are reasons to be skeptical of the externality argument in practice.
Using U.S. and French tax reforms, Fack and
Landais (2010) show that the response of
charitable deductions to tax rates is concentrated primarily along the avoidance margin
(rather than the real contribution margin).28
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) examine the U.S.
mortgage interest deduction and conclude
that it subsidizes housing ownership along
the intensive margin (size of the home) but
27 Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that
optimal tax formulas are the same in a model with fixed
prices of factors (with no incidence effects) and in a model
with variable prices (with incidence effects).
28 There is a large earlier literature finding significant responses of charitable giving to individual marginal
income tax rates. See, for example, Auten, Sieg, and
Clotfelter (2002).
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not the extensive margin (home ownership)
and that there is little evidence of externalities along the intensive margin. Moreover,
granting the existence of such externalities
does not imply that the implicit rate of subsidy approximates marginal social benefit.
Theoretically, suppose a fraction s of the
taxable income response to a tax rate increase
dτ is due to higher expenditures on activities
that create an externality with a social marginal value of exactly t dollars per dollar of
additional expenditure. In that case, formula
(8) applies by just substituting the alternative
tax base rate t with −1 multiplied by the per
dollar social marginal value of the externality. For example, in the extreme case where
all the taxable income response comes from
tax expenditures (s = 1) with income before
tax expenditures being unresponsive to tax
rates, and if t = τ (the social marginal value
of tax expenditures externalities is equal to
the income tax rate τ) then there is zero marginal excess burden from taxation as it is a
pure Pigouvian tax.29 More generally, to the
extent that the behavioral response to higher
tax rates generates some positive externalities, formula (3) will overstate the marginal
efficiency cost of taxation.
Because the bulk of items that are deductible from taxable income in the United
States—state and local income taxes, mortgage interest deductions, and charitable
giving—may generate fiscal or classical externalities, the elasticity of a broader, prededuction, concept of income (such as adjusted
gross income in the United States) is of interest in addition to a taxable income elasticity.
That is why many conceptual and empirical
analyses focus on adjusted gross income—
which is not net of such deductible items—
rather than taxable income. The elasticity of
taxable income and the elasticity of a broader
measure of income may bracket the elasticity
29 Saez (2004a) develops a simple optimal tax model to
capture those effects.
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applicable to welfare analysis. As discussed
above, we are skeptical that itemized deductions in the U.S. tax code necessarily produce
strong positive externalities. Therefore, we
will ignore this possibility and treat itemized
deduction responses to tax rates as efficiency
costs in the following sections.
Classical externalities might also arise in
agency models where executives set their
own pay by expending efforts to influence
the board of directors.30 It is conceivable
that such pay-setting efforts depend on the
level of the top income tax rate and would
increase following a top tax rate cut. In
such a case, top executives’ compensation
increases come at the expense of shareholders’ returns, which produces a negative externality.31 Such an externality would
reduce the efficiency costs of taxation (as in
that case correcting the externality dictates
a positive tax).
2.4 Changes in the Tax Base Definition and
Tax Erosion
As pointed out by Slemrod (1995) and
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), how broadly
the tax base is defined affects the taxable
income elasticity. In their model, the more
tax deductions that are allowed, the higher
will be the taxable income elasticity. This
implies that the taxable income elasticity
depends not only on individual p
 references
(as we posited in our basic model in section
2.1), but also on the tax structure. Therefore,

30 Under perfect information and competition, executives would not be able to set their pay at a different level
from their marginal product. In reality, the marginal product of top executives cannot be perfectly observed, which
creates scope for influencing pay, as discussed extensively
in Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
31 Such externalities would fit into the framework developed by Chetty (2009b). Following the analysis of Chetty
and Saez (2010), such agency models produce an externality only if the pay contract is not second-best Pareto efficient, e.g., it is set by executives and large shareholders on
the board without taking into account the best interests of
small shareholders outside the board.
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the tax base choice affects the taxable income
elasticity. Thus, as Slemrod and Kopczuk
(2002) argue, the ETI can be thought of as a
policy choice. The same logic applies to the
enforcement of a given tax base, which can
particularly affect the behavioral response to
tax rate changes of avoidance schemes and
evasion.
To see this point, suppose that we estimate
a large taxable income elasticity because the
tax base includes many loopholes making
it easy to shelter income from tax (we discuss in detail such examples using U.S. tax
reforms below). In the model of section 2.1,
this suggests that a low tax rate is optimal.
However, in a broader context, a much better policy may be to eliminate loopholes so
as to reduce the taxable income elasticity
and the deadweight burden of taxation.32 For
example, Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate
that the taxable income elasticity for upper
income earners is 0.57, leading to a revenue
maximizing rate of only 54 percent using formula (7) with a = 1.5. However, they find a
much lower elasticity of 0.17 for a broader
income definition for upper incomes, implying that the revenue maximizing tax rate
would be as high as 80 percent if the income
tax base were broadened.33
Consider a simple example that illustrates
this argument. As in our basic model, individuals supply effort to earn income z. Now
allow that individuals can, at some cost, shelter part of their income z into another form
that might receive preferable tax treatment.
Let us denote w + y = z, where y is sheltered income and w is unsheltered income.
Formally, individuals maximize a utility function of the form u(c, z, y) that is decreasing
in z (earning income requires effort) and y
(sheltering income is costly). Suppose we
32 This possibility is developed in the context of an optimal linear income tax in Slemrod (1994).
33 Both scenarios assume away fiscal and classical externalities in behavioral responses.
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start from a comprehensive tax base where z
is taxed at rate τ, so that c = (1 − τ) · z + E
(E denotes a lump-sum transfer). In that
case, sheltering income is costly and provides
no tax benefit; individuals choose y = 0, and
the welfare analysis proceeds as in section
3.1 where the relevant elasticity is the elasticity of total income z with respect to 1 − τ.
Now recognize that the tax base is eroded
by excluding y from taxation. In that case,
c = (1 − τ) · w + y + E = (1 − τ) · z +
τ · y + E. Therefore, individuals will find it
profitable to shelter their income up to the
point where τ · uc  = uy . We can define the
indirect utility v(c′, w) = maxy   u(c′ + y, w +
y, y) and the analysis of section 3.1 applies
using the elasticity of taxable income w with
respect to 1 − τ. Because w = z − y and
sheltered income y responds (positively) to
the tax rate τ, the elasticity of w is larger than
the elasticity of z and hence the deadweight
burden of taxation per dollar raised is higher
with the narrower base. Intuitively, giving
preferential treatment to y induces taxpayers
to waste resources to shelter income y, which
is pure deadweight burden. As a result, starting from the eroded tax base and introducing a small tax dt > 0 on y actually reduces
the deadweight burden from taxation, showing that the eroded tax base is a suboptimal
policy choice.34
Therefore, comprehensive tax bases with
low elasticities are preferable to narrow
bases with large elasticities. Of course this
conclusion abstracts from possible legitimate
reasons for narrowing the tax base, such as
administrative simplicity (as in the model of
Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002),35 redistributive

34 This can be proved easily in a separable model with
no income effects where u(c, z, y) = c − h1(z) − h2(y).
35 In many practical cases, however, tax systems with a
comprehensive tax base (such as a value added tax) may be
administratively simpler than a complex income tax with
many exemptions and a narrower base.
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concerns, and externalities such as charitable
contributions, as discussed above.36
3.

Empirical Estimation and
Identification Issues

3.1 A Framework to Analyze the
Identification Issues
To assess the validity of the empirical
methods used to estimate the ETI and to
explicate the key identification issues, it
is useful to consider a very basic model of
income reporting behavior. In year t, individual i reports income zit and faces a marginal
tax rate of τit  = T′(zit ). Assume that reported
income zitresponds to marginal tax rates with
elasticity e so that zit  = z  0it  · (1 − τit )e , where
z  0it  is income reported when the marginal tax
rate is zero, which we call potential income.37
Therefore, using logs, we have:
(12) log zit  = e · log(1 − τit ) + log z  0it    .
Note, in light of our previous preceding
discussion, the assumptions that are embedded in this simple model: (a) there are no
income effects on reported income (as virtual income E is excluded from specification
(12), (b) the response to tax rates is immediate and permanent (so that short-term and
long-term elasticities are identical), (c) the
elasticity e is constant over time and uniform
across individuals at all levels of income,38 (d)
individuals have perfect knowledge of the tax
structure and choose z it after they know the

36 The public choice argument that narrow bases constrain Leviathan governments would fall in that category,
as a Leviathan government produces a negative externality.
37  A quasi-linear utility function of the form
u(c, z) = c − z0 (z/z0 )1+1/e

/(1 + 1/e) generates such income response functions.
38 This assumption can be relaxed in most cases, but it
sometimes has important consequences for identification,
as we discuss below.
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exact realization of potential income z  0it.  We
revisit these assumptions below.
Even within the context of this simple
model, an OLS regression of log 
zit on
log (1 − τit) would not identify the elasticity
e in the presence of a graduated income tax
schedule because τit is positively correlated
with potential log-income log z  0it;  this occurs
because the marginal tax rate may increase
with realized income z. Therefore, it is necessary to find instruments correlated with τit,
but uncorrelated with potential log-income,
log z  0it,  to identify the elasticity e.39 The recent
taxable income elasticity literature has used
changes in the tax rate structure created
by tax reforms to obtain such instruments.
Intuitively, in order to isolate the effects of
the net-of-tax rate, one would want to compare observed reported incomes after the tax
rate change to the incomes that would have
been reported had the tax change not taken
place. Obviously, the latter are not observed
and must be estimated. We describe in this
section the methods that have been proposed to estimate e and to address this identification issue.
3.2 Simple before and after Reform
Comparison
One simple approach uses reported
incomes before a tax reform as a proxy for
reported incomes after the reform (had the
reform not taken place). This simple difference estimation method amounts to comparing reported incomes before and after
the reform and attributing the change in
reported incomes to the changes in tax rates.

39 This issue arises in any context where the effective
price of the studied behavior depends on the marginal
income tax rate, such as charitable contributions. In a case
such as this, though, a powerful instrument is the marginal
tax rate that would apply in the event of zero contributions,
a “first-dollar” marginal tax rate. When the studied behavior is taxable income, this instrument is not helpful, as it is
generally zero for everyone.
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Suppose that all tax rates change at
time t = 1 because of a tax reform. Using
repeated cross sections spanning the pre- and
post-reform periods, one can estimate the
following two-stage-least-squares regression:
(13)

log zit  = e · log(1 − τit ) + εit,

using the post-reform indicator 1(t ≥ 1) as
an instrument for log(1 − τit). This regression identifies e if εit is uncorrelated with
1(t ≥ 1). In the context of our simple model
(12), this requires that potential log-incomes
are not correlated with time. This assumption is very unlikely to hold in practice, as real
economic growth creates a direct correlation
between income and time. If more than two
years of data are available, one could add a
linear trend β · t in (13) to control for secular growth. However, as growth rates vary
year-to-year due to macroeconomic business
cycles, the elasticity estimate will be biased
if economic growth happens to be different from year t = 0 to year t = 1 for reasons
unrelated to the level of tax rates; in this case
the regression will ascribe to the tax change
the impact of an unrelated, but coincident
change in average incomes.
In many contexts, however, tax reforms
affect subgroups of the population differentially, and in some cases they leave tax rates
essentially unchanged for most of the population. For example, in the United States
during the last three decades, the largest
absolute changes in tax rates have taken
place at the top of the income distribution,
with much smaller changes on average in
the broad middle. In that context, one can
use the group less (or not at all) affected by
the tax change as a control and hence proxy
unobserved income changes in the affected
group (absent the tax reform) with changes
in reported income in the control group.
Such methods naturally lead to consideration of difference-in-differences estimation
methods discussed in section 3.4.
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3.3 Share Analysis
When the group affected by the tax
reform is relatively small, one can simply
normalize incomes of the group affected by
a tax change by the average income in the
population to control for macroeconomic
growth. Indeed, recently the most dramatic
changes in U.S. marginal federal income tax
rates have taken place at the top percentile
of the income distribution. Therefore, and
following Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and
Slemrod (1996), a natural measure of the
evolution of top incomes relative to the average is the change in the share of total income
reported by the top percentile.40 Panel A
of figure 1 displays the average marginal
tax rate (weighted by income) faced by the
top percentile of income earners (scaled on
the left y-axis) along with the share of total
personal income reported by the top percentile earners (scaled on the right y-axis)
from 1960 to 2006.41 The figure shows that
since 1980 the marginal tax rate faced by
the top 1 percent has declined dramatically.
It is striking to note that the share received
by the top 1 percent of income recipients
started to increase precisely after 1981—
when marginal tax rates started to decline.
Furthermore, the timing of the jump in the
share of top incomes from 1986 to 1988 corresponds exactly with a sharp drop in the
weighted average marginal tax rate from 45
percent to 29 percent after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. These correspondences in timing, first noted by Feenberg and Poterba
(1993), provide circumstantial, but quite
compelling evidence that the reported
40 In what follows, we always exclude realized capital
gains from our income measure, as realized capital gains
in general receive preferential tax treatment, and there is
a large literature analyzing specifically capital gains realization behavior and taxes (see Auerbach 1988 for a discussion
of this topic). This issue is revisited in section 4.1.
41 This figure is an update of a figure presented in Saez
(2004b).
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incomes of the high-income individuals are
indeed responsive to marginal tax rates.
Panel B of figure 1 shows the same income
share and marginal tax rate series for the next
9 percent of highest-income tax filers (i.e.,
the top decile excluding the top 1 percent
from panel A). Their marginal tax rate follows a different pattern, first increasing from
1960 to 1981 due primarily to bracket creep
(as the tax system in this period was not
indexed for inflation), followed by a decline
until 1988 and relative stability afterwards.
In contrast to the top 1 percent, however, the
share of the next 9 percent in total income
is very smooth and trends slightly upward
during the entire period. Most importantly,
it displays no correlation with the level of the
marginal tax rate either in the short run or in
the long run. Thus, the comparison of panel
A and panel B suggests that the behavioral
responses of the top 1 percent are very different from those of the rest of the top decile,
and hence that the elasticity e is unlikely to
be constant across income groups.
Using the series displayed in figure 1,
and assuming that there is no tax change for
individuals outside the top groups, one can
estimate the elasticity of reported income
around a tax reform episode taking place
between pre-reform year t 0and post-reform
year t1 as follows:
log pt1   − log pt0 
__
(14) e =    
   
   ,
log(1 − τp, 
 t1 ) − log(1 − τp, 
 t0 )
where pt is the share of income accruing to
the top 1 percent (or the next 9 percent)
earners in year t and τ p ,t is the average marginal tax rate (weighted by income) faced by
taxpayers in this income group in year t. This
method identifies the elasticity if, absent the
tax change, the top 1 percent income share
would have remained constant from year
t0to year t1. As shown in table 1, panel A,
applying this simple method using the series
depicted in figure 1 around the 1981 tax
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Figure 1. Top Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960–2006
Source: Updated version of figure 2 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
Income excludes realized capital gains, as well as Social Security and unemployment insurance benefits.
The figure displays the income share (right y-axis) and the average marginal tax rate (left y-axis) (weighted by
income) for the top 1 percent (panel A) and for the next 9 percent (panel B) income earners.
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Table 1

Elasticity Estimates using Top Income Share Time Series
Top 1 percent

Next 9 percent

(1)

(2)

Panel A. Tax reform episodes
1981 vs. 1984 (ERTA 1981)
1986 vs. 1988 (TRA 1986)
1992 vs. 1993 (OBRA 1993)
1991 vs. 1994 (OBRA 1993)

0.60
1.36
0.45
−0.39

0.21
−0.20

Panel B. Full time series 1960–2006
No time trends
Linear time trend
Linear and square time trends
Linear, square, and cube time trends

1.71
(0.31)
0.82
(0.20)
0.74
(0.06)
0.58
(0.11)

0.01
(0.13)
−0.02
(0.02)
−0.05
(0.03)
−0.02
(0.02)

Notes: Estimates in panel A are obtained using series from figure 1 and using the formula e = [log(income share after
reform)-log(income share before reform)]/[log(1 – MTR after reform) – log(1 – MTR before reform)].
Estimates in panel B are obtained by time-series regression of log(top 1 percent income share) on a constant, log
(1 – average marginal tax rate), and polynomials time controls from 1960 to 2006 (44 observations). OLS regression.
Standard errors from Newey-West with eight lags.

reform by comparing 1981 and 1984 generates an elasticity of 0.60 for the top 1 percent.
Comparing 1986 and 1988 around the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 yields a very large elasticity of 1.36 for the top 1 percent.42 In contrast,
column 2 in table 1 shows that the elasticities
for the next 9 percent are much closer to zero
around those two tax episodes. The 1993 tax
reform also generates a substantial elasticity
of 0.45 for the top 1 percent when comparing
1992 and 1993. Strikingly, though, comparing
42 Goolsbee (2000a) found a similarly large elasticity using the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and a related
methodology.
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1991 to 1994 yields a negative elasticity for
the top 1 percent. This difference in elasticities is likely due to retiming of income around
the 1993 reform, which produced a large
short-term response, but perhaps no longterm response. Hence, table 1 shows that the
elasticity estimates obtained in this way are
sensitive to the specific reform, the income
group, as well as the choice of years—important issues we will come back to later on.
A natural way to estimate the elasticity e
using the full time-series evidence is to estimate a time-series regression of the form:
(15)

 ) + εt.
log pt  = e · log(1 − τp,t
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As reported in table 1, such a regression generates a very high estimate of the elasticity e
of 1.71 for the top 1 percent.43 However, this
is an unbiased estimate only if, absent any
marginal tax rate changes, the top 1 percent
income share series would have remained
constant or moved in a way that is uncorrelated with the evolution of marginal tax rates.
But it is entirely possible that inequality
changed over time for reasons unrelated to
tax changes: the secular increase in income
concentration in the United States since the
1960s was almost certainly not entirely driven
by changes in the top tax rates, hence biasing
upward the estimate of e.44 For example, figure 1 shows that there was a sharp increase in
the top 1 percent income share from 1994 to
2000 in spite of little change in the marginal
tax rate faced by the top 1 percent, which
suggests that changes in marginal tax rates
are not the sole determinant of the evolution
of top incomes (at least in the short run).45
It is possible to add controls for various factors affecting income concentration through
channels other than tax rates in regression
(15), as in Slemrod (1996). Unfortunately,
we do not have a precise understanding of
what those factors might be. An agnostic
approach to this problem adds time trends
to (15). As shown in table 1, such time trends
substantially reduce the estimated elasticity, although it remains significant and above
0.5. The key problem is that we do not know
exactly what time-trend specification is necessary to control for non-tax-related changes,

43 The estimated elasticity for the next 9 percent is very
small (e = 0.01), and not significantly different from zero.
44 See Katz and Autor (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of trends in wage inequality in the United States since
1960. Reverse causality is also a possibility. If incomes of
the already affluent increase, the group might have more
political influence and success in lobbying the government
to cut top tax rates.
45 Slemrod and Bakija (2001) call the behavior of
reported taxable income over this period a “nonevent
study.”
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and adding too many time controls necessarily destroys the time-series identification.
It could be fruitful to extend this framework to a multicountry time-series analysis. In that case, global time trends will not
destroy identification, although it is possible
that inequality changes differentially across
countries (for non-tax-related reasons), in
which case country-specific time trends
would be required and a similar identification
problem would arise. Anthony B. Atkinson
and Andrew Leigh (2010) and Jesper Roine,
Jonas Vlachos, and Daniel Waldenstrom
(2009) propose first steps in that direction.
The macroeconomic literature has recently
used cross-country time-series analysis to
analyze the effects of tax rates on aggregate
labor supply (see, e.g., Ohanian, Raffo, and
Rogerson 2008), but has not directly examined tax effects on reported income, let alone
on reported income by income groups.
3.4 Difference-in-Differences Methods
Most of the recent literature has used
micro-based regressions using “differencein-differences” methods46 in which changes
in reported income of a treatment group
(experiencing a tax change) are compared to
changes for a “control” group (which does not
experience the same, or any, tax change).47
To illustrate the identification issues that
arise with difference-in-differences methods, we will examine the 1993 tax reform in
the United States that introduced two new
income tax brackets—raising rates for those
at the upper end of incomes from 31 percent (in 1992 and before) to 36 percent or
39.6 percent (in 1993 and after) and enacted
46  For earlier reviews of this literature, see Slemrod
(1998) and Giertz (2004).
47  Note that share analysis is conceptually related to
the difference-in-differences method as share analysis
compares the evolution of incomes in a given quantile (the
numerator of the share is the treatment group) relative to
the full population (the denominator of the share is implicitly the control group).
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only minor other changes (see appendix A for
details). Figure 1 shows that the average marginal tax rate for the top 1 percent increased
sharply from 1992 to 1993, but that the marginal tax rate for the next 9 percent was not
affected. Our empirical analysis is based on
the Treasury panel of tax returns described
in Giertz (2008). As discussed in appendix
B, those panel data are created by linking
the large annual tax return data stratified by
income used by U.S. government agencies.
Therefore, the data include a very large number of top 1 percent taxpayers.
3.4.1 Repeated Cross-Section Analysis
Let us denote by T the group affected by
the tax change (the top 1 percent in our example) and by C a group not affected by the
reform (the next 9 percent in our example).48
We denote by t0the pre-reform year and by
t1the post-reform year. Generalizing our initial specification (13), we can estimate the
two-stage-least-squares regression:
(16)

log zit   = e · log(1 − τit )
+ α · 1(t = t1 )
+ β · 1(i ∈ T ) + εit,

on a repeated cross-section sample including
both the treatment and control groups and
including the year t 0and year t1 samples, and
using as an instrument for log(1 − τit) the
post-reform and treatment group interaction
1(t = t1 ) · 1(i ∈ T).
Although we refer in this section to
income tax rate schedule changes as a treatment, they certainly do not represent a classical treatment in which a random selection
of taxpayers is presented with a changed tax
48  Restricting the control group to the next 9 percent
increases its similarity (absent tax changes) to the treatment group.
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rate schedule, while a control group of taxpayers is not so subject. In fact, in any given
year all taxpayers of the same filing status
face the same rate schedule. However, when
the rates applicable at certain income levels
change more substantially than the rates at
other levels of income, some taxpayers are
more likely to face large changes in the applicable marginal tax rate than other taxpayers.
However, when the likely magnitude of the
tax rate change is correlated with income, any
non-tax-related changes in taxable income
(i.e., z  0it)  that vary systematically by income
group will need to be disentangled from the
effect on taxable incomes of the rate changes.
The two-stage-least-squares estimate from
(16) is a classical difference-in-differences
estimate equal to:
(17) e = ([E(log z it1  | T) − E(log zit0  | T)]

)/

− [E(log z it1   | C) − E(log z it0   | C)]

([E(log(1 − τ

it1 ) | T)



− E(log(1 − τit0 ) | T)]

)

− [E(log(1 − τit1 ) | C) − E(log(1 − τit0 ) | C)] .

Thus, the elasticity estimate is the ratio of the
pre- to post-reform change in log incomes in
the treatment group minus the same ratio for
the control group to the same difference-indifferences in log net-of-tax rates.
Using repeated cross-sectional data from
1992 (pre-reform) and 1993 (post-reform),
we define the treatment group as the top 1
percent and the control group as the next 9
percent (90th percentile to 99th percentile).
This designation is made separately for each
of the pre- and post-reform years. Note that
being in the treatment group depends on
the taxpayer’s behavior. Table 2, panel A
shows an elasticity estimate of 0.284, which
reflects the fact that the top 1 percent
incomes decreased from 1992 to 1993 while
the next 9 percent incomes remained stable
as shown in figure 1. However, comparing
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Table 2

Elasticity Estimates using the 1993 Top Rate Increase among Top 1 percent Incomes
Control group
A. Repeated cross-section analysis
A1. Comparing two years only
1992 and 1993
1991 and 1994
A2. Using all years 1991 to 1997
1991 to 1997 (no time trends controls)
1991 to 1997 (with time trends controls)
B. Panel analysis
B1. Comparing two years only
1992 to 1993 changes (no controls)
1991 to 1994 changes (no controls)
1992 to 1993 changes (log base year income control)
1992 to 1993 changes (+ splines income controls)
B2. Using all 1991–1992, . . . , 1996–1997 changes
No income controls
Base year log income control
Base year log income + splines controls
Base year log income + splines controls
(using predicted MTR change instrument)

Next 9 percent

Next 49 percent

(1)

(2)

0.284
(0.069)

0.231
(0.069)

−0.363
(0.077)

−0.524
(0.075)

−0.373
(0.053)

−0.641
(0.052)

0.467
(0.073)

0.504
(0.071)

1.395
(0.107)

1.878
(0.184)

2.420
(0.221)

3.352
(0.446)

−0.721
(0.213)

0.814
(0.149)

−1.669
(1.052)

−1.866
(0.711)

1.395
(0.296)

1.878
(0.338)

0.537
(0.264)

0.955
(0.247)

0.564
(0.259)

0.723
(0.260)

0.143
(0.200)

0.237
(0.077)

Notes: Estimates based on a panel of tax returns (see appendix and Giertz 2008).
Panel A estimates are obtained from 2SLS regression: log(zit) = e · log(1 − τit) + α · 1(top 1 percent) + β · 1(postreform) + εit using 1(top 1 percent) · 1(post-reform year) as instrument. Time controls in the last row of panel A2 are
group specific: γ1 · t · 1(top 1 percent) + γ2 · t · 1(not top 1 percent). Panel B1 estimates are obtained from 2SLS panel
regression: ∆log(zit) = e · ∆log(1 − τit) + εit using 1(top 1 percent in base year) as instrument. Base year income
controls log(zit) and 10 splines in zit are added in last two rows. In panel B2, comparisons 1991 to 1992, . . . , 1996 to
1997 are stacked and year dummies are included in the 2SLS regression. The instrument is 1(top 1 percent in base
year) · 1(t = 1992). Instrument MTR predicted change log[(1 − τ pit)/ (1 − τit)] is used in the 4th row of estimates
where τ pit is the marginal tax rate in year t + 1 using (inflation adjusted) year t income. In column 1, the estimates
are run using the top 10 percent tax filers (so that the treatment group is the top 1 percent and the control group is
the top 10 percent excluding the top 1 percent, “The next 9 percent”). In column 2, the estimates are run using the
top 50 percent tax filers (so that the control group is the top 50 percent excluding the top 1 percent, “The next 49
percent”).
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1991 to 1994 generates a negative elasticity,
as the top 1 percent incomes increased
faster than the next 9 percent incomes from
1991 to 1994 (figure 1). The sign switch
mirrors the results of table 1, column 1.49
As is standard in the case of differencein-differences estimation, formula (17) will
yield an unbiased estimate of the elasticity e
only if the p
 arallel trend assumption holds:
absent the tax change, the numerator would
have been zero, i.e., log-income changes
pre- to post-reform would have been the
same in the treatment and control groups.
In the case of our example, that means that
the incomes of the top 1 percent would have
grown at the same rate as the incomes of
the next 9 percent (absent the tax change).
Such an assumption can be examined using
pre-reform years or post-reform years to
construct placebo d
ifference-in-differences
estimates. As is clear from figure 1, the top 1
percent incomes increase sharply from 1994
to 2000 relative to average incomes, while the
share of the next 9 percent income is almost
flat. Therefore, the difference-in-differences
identification assumption is clearly violated in
the p
 ost-reform period.
In cases where the parallel trend assumption does not hold, we can generalize equation
(16) by pooling together several pre-reform
years and post-reform years and running the
following two-stage-least-squares regression
(assuming
the tax change takes place in
_
year t  ):
49 Estimates from table 2, panel A, are unweighted
(i.e., not weighted by income, zit ). In a previous version of
this paper (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2009), similar estimates are presented when weighting by income. Incomeweighting is standard in the ETI literature because it gives
proportionally more weight to high-income taxpayers,
because their response contributes proportionately more
to the aggregate elasticity (as discussed in section 2.1).
Here, cross-sectional estimates are not income-weighted
because of concerns from weighting by the dependent
variable. The estimates here are qualitatively similar to the
earlier income-weighted estimates, however, the absolute
magnitude of the estimates is smaller, especially for the
positive estimates reported in rows two and four.
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(18) log zit   = e · log(1 − τit )
_

+ α · 1(t ≥ t)

+ β · 1(i ∈ T) + γC· t

+ γT  · t · 1(i ∈ T) + εit,

where we have added separate time trends
for the control and treatment groups and
where the instrument is the _post-reform and
treatment interaction 1(t ≥ t) · 1(i ∈ T).
As shown in table 2, panel A, with no time
trends, the regression produces a negative
elasticity estimate of e = −0.40 because the
top 1 percent incomes increase faster than
next 9 percent incomes over the period 1991
to 1997 in spite of the top tax rate increase.
However, adding separate time trends generates a statistically significant and positive
elasticity estimate of e = 0.47. This positive
elasticity is consistent with figure 1: from
1991 to 1997, the share of income reported
by the top 1 percent incomes increases relative to the next 9 percent, but from 1992 to
1993, incomes for the top 1 percent incomes
fall overall and relative to the next 9 percent
of the income distribution, coinciding exactly
with the tax change. Hence, the pooled
regression (18) assumes that this reversal
is due to a large immediate and permanent
elasticity of reported income with respect
to tax rates. We discuss below the issue of
short-term versus long-term responses,
which is central to this particular tax episode. Column 2 in table 2 shows that those
repeated cross-section estimates are not sensitive to broadening the control group from
the next 9 percent to the next 49 percent,
because incomes for both the next 9 percent and the next 49 percent move together,
exhibiting very slow growth over the period.
Finally, note that if the control group
faces a tax change, difference-in-differences
estimates will be consistent only if the elasticities are the same for the two groups.
To see this, refer back to equation (17).
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Suppose that the control group experiences a change in tax rates that is half the
size of the tax rate change for the treatment group, so that E(log(1 − τit1 ) | C) −
E(log(1 − τit0 ) |C) = 0.5 · [E(log(1 − τit1 ) |T) −
E(log(1 − τit0 ) |T)]. Assume further that the difference-in-differences identification assumption holds, but that the elasticity in the control
group is zero while the elasticity is e T   > 0 in
the treatment group. In that case, we have
E(log zit1  | T) −E(log zit0  | T)
= eT  · [E(log(1 − τ it1 ) | T) − E(log(1 − τit0 ) | T)
and E(log zit1  | C) − E(log zit0  | C) = 0 and
hence formula (17) leads to e = 2 · eT : the
estimated elasticity is twice as large as the true
elasticity in the treatment group. This possibility might be relevant for interpreting the
effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986; table
1 shows that, based on share elasticities, the
elasticity around that episode may be large
for the top 1 percent, but close to zero for the
next 9 percent (and the next 9 percent experiences a tax rate cut that is about half of the
tax rate cut for the top 1 percent from 1986 to
1988). This may partly explain why Feldstein
(1995) obtained such large elasticities around
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a point made
originally by John Navratil (1995).
3.4.2 Panel Analysis
Following the influential analysis of
Feldstein (1995), the great majority of empirical studies of the ETI have used panel data.
With panel data, we can define the treatment group T as the top 1 percent of income
earners and the control group C as the next
9 percent of tax filers based on income in
pre-reform year t0 , and follow those tax filers
into the post-reform year t1 . We can then run
the two-stage-least-squares panel regression:
(19)
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(

)

z  it1 
1 − τit1 
_
log  _
zit0    = e · log   1 − τit  
0

+ εit,

using 1(i ∈ T) as the instrument. This regression estimates a difference-in-differences
parameter:
z  it1 
z  it1 
E log  _
  | T − E log  _
  | C

( zit  ) ( zit  )
   
(20) e =  ___
   
1−τ  it 
1−τ  it  .
0

0

E log _1  | T − E log _1  | C

[ (1−τ ) ]
it0 

[ (1−τ ) ]



it0 

As shown in table 2, panel B, such a regression generates a very large elasticity of 1.40,
as the top 1 percent income earners in 1992
experience a drop in reported taxable income
of about 15 percent in 1993, while the next 9
percent income earners in 1992 experience a
drop of less than 5 percent. As noted above,
this elasticity estimate is unbiased if, absent the
tax change, the numerator of (19) is zero: log
income changes are the same in the treatment
and control group. As we described in our
discussion of repeated cross-section analyses,
this assumption might be violated if there are
secular changes in income inequality: the top
1 percent incomes might have increased faster
than the next 9 percent earners even in the
absence of a tax change. In the case of panel
analysis, however, another problem arises.
Even in the absence of changes in the income
distribution, the identification assumption
might not hold because of mean reversion: the
top 1 percent incomes in base year t 0 are likely
to decrease because many individuals were in
the top 1 percent in year t0due to having large
positive transitory incomes.
To mitigate the mean reversion bias as
well as potential changes in income inequality, following Auten and Carroll (1999), one
can add year t0 income controls in regression (20), either in a simple way by including log zit0 , or in a richer way by including
either polynomials or splines in base-year
income.50 As shown in table 2, adding such
50 Decile-based splines are a set of ten variables. The
p-th spline is constant outside decile p (of the distribution
of log income) and varies like log income within the p-th
decile.
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income controls has a dramatic effect on the
estimates: the estimated elasticities become
negative with large absolute values and large
standard errors.51
With only two years of data, adding too
many base-year income controls destroys
identification by absorbing much of the
independent variation in tax rates, as the taxrate instrument—a dummy for those with
incomes in the top 1 percent in the base
year—is also a function of base-year income.
Therefore, we are skeptical that convincing
estimates of the ETI can be obtained from
a panel analysis using only two years of data
when the tax rate changes are concentrated
in a single part of the distribution (such as
the top percentile in our example).
To overcome this issue, one would want
to assess whether the numerator of (20) is
uniquely large when a tax reform happens
(relative to times when no tax reform happens). Therefore, following Gruber and
Saez (2002), we can add additional years in
regression (20) by stacking differences for
years 1991 to 1992, 1992 to 1993, . . ., 1996
to 1997, and adding year dummies as
follows:
(21)

(

)

1 − τit+1
 
zit+1
_
log  _
zit  
 = e · log   1 − τit  


+ f (zit) + αt  + εit,
where f (zit) denotes controls in base-year
income. In that case, we use as an instrument
1(i ∈ Tt) · 1(t = 1992), i.e., the interaction of
being in the top 1 percent in the base year
and the tax reform year 1992. Table 2 shows
that, compared to the elasticity estimate of
1.395 with no base-year income controls,
the estimate falls to around 0.5 to 0.6 when
51 Adding base-year income controls in the 1991 to
1994 comparison also makes the elasticity estimates negative and very imprecisely estimated.
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adding base-year income controls. The key
identifying assumption in this case is that,
absent the tax change, the extent of year-toyear mean reversion and year-to-year income
inequality changes are stable over the period
1991 to 1997. Note that the estimates are
no longer highly sensitive to the number of
income controls (and, as the income controls f (zit) are not year-specific, they do not
destroy the identification).
Additional Issues in Panel Analysis
A troubling issue with panel analysis
(relative to repeated cross-section analysis)
is that the identification assumptions lack
transparency because they mix assumptions
regarding mean reversion and assumptions
regarding changes in income inequality. As
a result, it is not possible to informally assess
the validity of the panel approach by examining graphs such as figure 1. When baseyear income controls are added this problem
becomes even more severe. For example,
it is often impossible to tell to what extent
the income controls are adjusting for mean
reversion and to what extent they are controlling for divergence in the income distribution. Worse yet, these income controls
could hamper identification by absorbing
informative variation in the tax rates, which
are correlated with income. Our empirical
analysis also reveals considerable sensitivity
of panel regressions even in the case where
many years are pooled and many base-year
income controls are included (as in table 2,
panel B2).
First, comparing columns 1 and 2 on
table 2, panel B2, we note that the panelbased estimates are somewhat sensitive to
the choice of the control group, probably
due to differences in mean reversion across
control groups. Therefore, in situations with
mean reversion, it is useful to include episodes of both increases and decreases in tax
rates for identification, as mean reversion
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creates biases in opposite directions in the
case of tax increases versus tax decreases.
Second, the panel regressions are sensitive to the choice of the instrument for the
marginal tax rate. We have so far defined the
instrument based on membership in the top
1 percent group to exploit the fact that the
1993 tax change was concentrated among
the top 1 percent. However, to account for
tax schedule changes throughout the income
distribution, many studies have instead used
a different instrument: the predicted change
in log net-of-tax rates assuming that income,
often inflation-adjusted income, remains the
same as in the base year (allowing the tax
schedule to change).52 Such an instrument
has the advantage of taking account of all
changes in the tax rate schedule. In the case
of the 1993 reform, the choice of the instrument should not matter much because the
tax rate change was concentrated among the
top 1 percent. However, the elasticity estimates, shown in the fourth row of panel B2,
are much smaller when using the predicted
change in the log of the net-of-tax tax rate as
an instrument. This may be due to the fact
that predicted marginal tax rate changes are
sometimes nonzero due to minor changes in
the tax code or various provisions that are not
indexed for inflation. If tax filers are unlikely
to respond to such minor changes, this may
explain why estimates using the traditional
instrument are smaller than those using the
top 1 percent instrument.
Some authors have proposed alternatively
to construct the instrument based either on
the average of pre- and post-reform income
(Carroll 1998) or on income in a year midway between the years used to construct

52  We estimated the predicted marginal tax rate in
year t + 1 by inflating year t incomes using the inflation
adjustment used in the tax code. As a result, only statutory
changes in the tax law such as the top rate reduction in
1993 or elements of the tax code that are not indexed can
produce a change in predicted net-of-tax rates.
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the difference (Blomquist and Selin 2009).53
While using average income helps with mean
reversion, changes in the distribution of
income remain a potential issue. Practically,
empirical attempts at using such alternative
instruments have shown that estimates are
quite sensitive to the choice of instruments,
suggesting that the standard methods do not
control adequately for mean reversion.
Advantages of Panel Analysis
Under some assumptions, panel analysis
offers several advantages. First, in principle,
panel analysis is useful (relative to repeated
cross-section analysis) if individual income
in a base year is a good predictor of income
after the reform (absent any tax change). This
is restating in a positive way the point that
the presence of income mobility weakens the
case for using panel data.54 In reality, there is
substantial persistence of individual income
from year to year and therefore panel estimates tend to have smaller standard errors
than repeated cross-section estimates (keeping sample size the same). In practice, this
advantage is counterbalanced by the fact that
there is a non-negligible fraction of individuals who experience very substantial mobility
and—based on our computations—can have
a significant influence on panel estimates, so
that some trimming of outliers is needed to
obtain more stable estimates.
Second, panel analysis is also useful when
one wants to analyze a tax change targeted to
a specific group and there is a concern that
53 Caroline Weber (2010) argues for constructing the
tax rate instrument to be a function of income lagged one
or more years before the base year, with the appropriate
lag depending on the degree of serial correlation of transitory income; in this framework, addressing heterogeneous
income trends requires that one-year income controls be
instrumented with income from the same lag as for the tax
rate variables.
54 To see this, note that in the extreme case where
potential incomes z  0it  are iid, there would be no point in
using panel data.
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the composition of this group will change
significantly over time in the repeated cross
sections. Consider again the case of the 1993
reform, which affected the top 1 percent
income earners. Suppose that the increase
in the top 1 percent income share is due
entirely to new tax filers who entered the
high-income category in 1993 for reasons
unrelated to the tax change and who were
not part of the control group either (e.g., a
student starting a successful new dot-com
company), and that neither the top 1 percent
income earners nor the next 9 percent control group in 1992 experienced any change in
income (absent the tax change). In that case,
the repeated cross-section analysis is biased
because of composition effects (that change
the cross-section distribution of income for
nontax reasons), but the panel analysis is
unbiased because (1) there is no mean reversion among the 1992 top 1 percent income
earners relative to the control group and (2)
there is no change in inequality from 1992 to
1993 between the top 1 percent and the control group defined based on 1992 incomes.
Obviously these two assumptions never hold
exactly, as there is substantial mobility with
respect to the top 1 percent. For example,
Slemrod (1992) reports that, in the 1980s,
between 28 and 40 percent of the households
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution were new from one year to the next.
Finally, panel data are required to study
some questions other than the overall
response of reported incomes. For example,
if one wants to study how a tax change affects
income mobility (for example, do more
middle-income individuals become successful entrepreneurs following a tax rate cut?),
panel data is clearly necessary.
In sum, those considerations lead us to
conclude that the advantage of longitudinal
analysis relative to repeated cross-section
analysis has been somewhat exaggerated in
the empirical literature following Feldstein
(1995), especially when one wants to analyze
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tax changes happening primarily at the top
of the income distribution. In some contexts,
repeated cross-section analysis or sharebased time-series analysis may be a more
robust and transparent approach.55
3.4.3 Short-Term versus Long-Term
Responses
Figure 1 illustrates the difficulty of obtaining convincing estimates of the (short- and
long-term) elasticity of reported income
with respect to the net-of-tax rate. As already
discussed, the anticipated high-end tax rate
increases of 1993 seem to have generated a
temporary decline in top 1 percent incomes
in 1993 and a temporary upward spike in
1992 as tax filers moved reported taxable
income from 1993 into 1992 to take advantage of the lower 1992 tax rate. As a result, the
elasticity estimated using only the years 1992
and 1993 is large. We know something about
the nature of this short-term response. For
executives, Goolsbee (2000b) showed that
indeed a significant fraction of the response
was due to timing in the realization of stock
options, and Parcell (1995) and Sammartino
and Weiner (1997) document the extent of
year-end retiming of taxable income in the
form of bonuses. In these cases, we would
expect the long-term response to be much
smaller.
An important question is whether the
clearly visible short-term responses persist over time. In particular, how should we
interpret the continuing rise in top incomes
after 1994? If one thinks that this surge is
evidence of diverging trends between highincome individuals and the rest of the population that are independent of tax policy, then
the long-term response to the tax change is
less than estimated. Alternatively, one could
55 Obviously, access to panel data is never worse than
access to repeated cross-sectional data, as it is always possible to ignore the longitudinal aspect of panel data and
carry out a repeated cross-section analysis with panel data.
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argue that the surge in top incomes since the
mid-1990s was the long-term consequence
of the decrease in tax rates in the 1980s, and
that such a surge would not have occurred
had high-income tax rates remained as high
as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. It is,
though, very difficult to disentangle those
various scenarios with a single time series of
top incomes and top tax rates. As mentioned
above, cross-country time-series analysis
might be a fruitful area to make progress,
taking advantage of varying time patterns of
tax rate changes.
The literature on capital gains realizations
has developed dynamic micro-econometrics
models to estimate simultaneously shortterm and long-term responses to tax changes
(see e.g., Burman and Randolph 1994). In the
case of the ETI, such explicit modeling has
only been used in a few studies (Holmlund
and Söderström 2008, Giertz 2010, and
Heim 2007 and 2009). These papers augment the traditional panel specification (21)
by adding a lagged change in the marginal
tax rate term and sometimes a prospective
rate change term. If some components of
taxable income respond with a one-year lag
then, in principle, the lagged term will capture this effect; a future tax rate term could
pick up timing responses to anticipated tax
rate changes. This method could be useful to
disentangle short-term from medium-term
responses, although obtaining compelling
identification is difficult.
3.4.4 Alternative Control Groups
The tax code offers some possibilities
to generate alternative control groups that
might be more comparable to treatment
groups than the income-based control groups
used in the analyses discussed heretofore.
For example, inflation (before the inflation
adjustment of the U.S. income tax schedule after the Tax Reform Act of 1986) or the
loss of a personal exemption can also push
taxpayers into a higher bracket, and in some
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cases married and unmarried couples experience different changes in their tax schedules.
Those changes have been explored by Saez
(2003), Looney and Singhal (2006), Singleton
(2011), and Feldman and Katuscak (2009).
The advantage of studying those changes is
that one can compare taxpayers who are very
similar both in income and initial marginal
tax rate—but yet face different prospects for
changes in marginal tax rates—and hence
potentially make a much more convincing
case for identification.
The main drawback of this strategy is that
taxpayers may not be aware of the minute
details of the tax code, and hence might not
respond to very localized changes in their
marginal tax rate situation. As a result, elasticities obtained from those studies might not
be relevant to predict behavioral responses
to well-advertised, more salient, and broader
tax rate changes. This lack of perfect information might also explain why there does
not appear to be significant bunching at the
kink points of the tax schedule (Saez 2010)
as predicted in the standard model.56 Chetty
et al. (2011) use Danish tax return data and
show that large kinks generate disproportionately stronger bunching responses than
small kinks, consistent with the hypothesis
that tax filers do not pay as much attention to
small tax changes as they do to large changes.
As a result, elasticities estimated from large
changes may be larger than elasticities estimated from small changes, an important
point formally developed in Chetty (2009c).
More generally, to the extent that informational considerations are a central aspect
of the size of the behavioral response, it is
important to develop models of how and
when individuals learn about their budget
set and to consider the consequences of the
56 Chetty and Saez (2009) show that providing information to EITC recipients does produce changes in subsequent reported incomes, indicating that tax filers do not
have perfect information about the tax system.
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learning process for the optimal design of tax
and transfer policies. Tax response analysis
thus faces this fundamental tension: large
reforms are the most likely to be noticed and
understood by taxpayers, but often do not
generate fully convincing control groups for
identification. Small reforms or quirks in the
tax code can generate better control groups,
but might not lead to meaningful, generalizable estimates if most taxpayers are not
aware of such tax changes or provisions.57
3.4.5 Tax Base Changes
Although estimation of the ETI focuses
on changes in the schedule of tax rates, the
definition of the tax base subject to the rate
schedule also changes periodically, often at
the same time the rates change as part of
comprehensive tax reform legislation. This
raises a number of issues that are especially
important when, as in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, multiple tax base changes accompanied the tax rate changes, and are much
less important in cases like the 1993 change,
when the top marginal tax rate changed
with little base definition change. That
income tax rates changes often coincide
with changes in the definition of taxable
income is not a coincidence, because the
theme of many income tax reforms since
the 1980s has been to broaden the tax base
and lower the rates applied to the base in a
revenue-neutral way.
Identifying the taxable income elasticity
when both the tax base and tax rates change
becomes problematic because the taxable
income elasticity is plausibly different in
the post-reform era compared to the prereform era. For example, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 broadened the tax base by both
reducing deductions and the attractiveness
of tax “shelters.” It is likely that, due to these
57 Chetty (2009a) develops an econometric method to
set bounds on elasticities when responses are incomplete
due to lack of awareness of taxpayers.

01_Saez.indd 31

31

changes, the taxable income elasticity post1986 was lower than pre-1986, as documented by Kopczuk (2005). In this situation
even an otherwise well-specified estimation
strategy will yield an estimate of neither the
pre- nor post-reform elasticity, but rather
a weighted average of the two, where the
weights need not be positive.
Second, when the definition of the tax base
changes, using as the dependent variable a
concurrent definition of taxable income runs
the risk of confounding tax-induced changes
in behavior with purely definitional changes.
For example, the base broadening of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 would, ceteris paribus,
show taxable incomes to have increased, perhaps to different degrees at different income
levels.58 This problem suggests using either
a consistent pre- or post-reform definition.59
When the issue is changing deductions or
credits, for data availability reasons it is generally easier to use the broader definition
(i.e., not net of the deductions), because
otherwise the investigator needs, but will
not have, measures of deductions or credits that are not reported in the year with the
broader base; the argument is reversed when
new sources of income are added to the tax
base. Because the former type of broadening
was more prevalent, those studying the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 have attempted to analyze a post-1986 definition of taxable income;
this cannot, though, be done in a completely
satisfactory manner.

58 This is why Slemrod (1996) adjusted downward the
post-1986 Feenberg and Poterba (1993) measures of the
high-income shares; otherwise, the change from including
40 percent of capital gains in taxable income in the years up
to 1986 to 100 percent inclusion afterward would increase
the measured high-income share even in the absence of
any behavioral response because capital gains comprise a
disproportionately high fraction of income for high-income
people.
59 Alternatively one could, like Kopczuk (2005), employ
a model where independent variables account for changes
to the tax base.
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Even if a consistent measure of taxable
income could be constructed, the choice
of which constant-law definition of taxable
income to use is by no means an innocuous
one.60 If the objective is to estimate the leakage from a given base when the rate of tax
is altered, either method has problems. As
discussed in Auerbach and Slemrod (1997),
the response to a reform that changes both
the marginal tax rate and the tax base does
not, without further assumptions, reveal the
impact of a tax change for a given base. If the
broader definition of taxable income is used,
the measured response mixes two things: the
response of the old base to an increase in the
net-of-tax rate, and the response of the newly
included base to a decrease in the net-of-tax
rate. On the other hand, the response of the
pre-reform base will probably overestimate
the partial elasticity of the base with respect
to a change in the tax rate. Using a consistent
post-reform definition will produce a change
in taxable income that is less than what is
obtained using the pre-reform definition.
3.5 Multiple Tax Rates: The Special Case of
Capital Gains Realizations
Another complicating factor is capital gains. Although real accrued gains are
income according to the Haig-Simons definition, those countries that tax capital gains
at all do so upon realization (usually sale),
and those countries that do tax realizations
now generally subject them to a lower rate
than applies to other income. In the United
States, the extent of preferential tax has varied significantly since 1980. Before the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 40 percent of longterm gains were included in taxable income;
with a top rate of 50 percent, the top rate
on realizations was 20 percent. When the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 lowered the top rate to
60 An exception would arise if the elasticity of substitution between activities whose tax status changes and those
whose status does not change equals zero (Heim 2007).
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28 percent, the exclusion was eliminated, so
that the top rate on long-term capital gains
was also 28 percent. Since 1986, the top rate
on ordinary income has risen and a preferential rate has been reintroduced; since 2003,
the two rates have been 35 percent and 15
percent, respectively.
Almost all studies of the ETI in the United
States have excluded capital gains realizations from the measure of taxable income
or broad income, on the reasonable grounds
that they are generally subject to a different
marginal tax rate than other income. It is also
true that they are especially responsive to
anticipated changes in the applicable tax rate.
(See Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare 1994).
However, ignoring capital gains completely
raises some difficult issues. As background,
in the United States, they constitute a very
large fraction of the taxable income of the
top income groups.61 Second, they fluctuate
year-to-year much more than other income,
both in the aggregate and, especially, for
given taxpayers, generating significant yearto-year mobility in and out of the top 1 percent income group (capital gains included).
Some taxpayers have opportunities for
converting wage and salary income to capital gains income—and these opportunities
are exercised when the tax advantages of so
doing are sufficient. Because the tax advantage depends on the differential between the
rate on ordinary income and capital gains,
this rate matters and should ideally be controlled for in analyses of how the tax rate on
ordinary income affects the reported amount
of ordinary income. Furthermore, converting ordinary income to capital gains income
often is accompanied by deferral of the realization of the latter for tax purposes, so the

61 In 2005, for example, for taxpayers with AGI exceeding $500,000, who represent just less than 1 percent of all
taxable returns, taxable net capital gain comprised 33.3
percent of AGI, compared to 3.8 percent of AGI for all
other taxable returns.
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offsetting revenue may not come for several
years, if ever.
Another issue is that, in microeconometric
analysis, the standard procedure is to calculate the marginal tax rate on ordinary income
assuming no capital gains income. This would
be appropriate if decisions that trigger ordinary income were made before decisions
regarding capital gains realizations, but this
is unrealistic and thus this procedure causes
error in measuring the actual MTR. The
same issues arise in share analysis. Slemrod
(1996) includes capital gains in his measure
of adjusted gross income, and includes as
explanatory variables the top rates on both
ordinary income and capital gains. He finds
no evidence that a higher capital gains tax
rate is associated with a higher share of wages
and salaries, though. Ideally, one would need
a model of joint determination of capital
gains and ordinary income as a function of
the marginal tax rates on capital gains and
ordinary income in the general methodology
of the elasticity of taxable income.
3.6 Income Shifting: The Anatomy of
Behavioral Responses
We have argued that estimating taxable
income elasticities in a fully convincing way
is challenging because of the difficulty of
untangling tax-related from non-tax-related
changes in reported incomes. Furthermore,
our conceptual analysis in section 2 showed
that, in addition to measuring the reported
taxable income elasticity, to obtain a welfare-relevant elasticity it may be important
to assess fiscal externalities. A way to make
progress on those two issues is to analyze
the “anatomy of the behavioral response”
(Slemrod 1996) by examining the components of reported income.
Figure 2 (updated from Saez 2004b) displays the share and composition of the top
0.01 percent of income earners in the United
States since 1960 along with the average marginal tax rate they faced (in bold line on the

01_Saez.indd 33

33

right y-axis). We focus on this very top group
because tax rate changes and tax responses
are arguably the strongest and most salient at
the very top. The figure divides income into
seven income components: (1) wages and salaries (which include bonuses and profits from
qualified exercised stock options), (2) dividends, (3) interest income, (4) sole proprietorship profits (profits from small businesses that
are fully owned by the taxpayer, this includes
most forms of self-employment income), (5)
partnership profits (profits from businesses
where the taxpayer is a partner such as a law
or medical practice partnership), (6) profits
from subchapter S corporations (taxed solely
at the individual level), and (7) other income.
Four points are worth noting about figure 2. First, the top 0.01 percent income
earners faced extremely high marginal tax
rates in the early 1960s (around 80 percent) that were reduced significantly by the
Kennedy tax cuts in 1964–65 (to about 65
percent). This implies a 75 percent increase
in the net-of-tax rate, a much larger increase
than either the 1981 tax cuts and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 tax rate reductions. In
spite of this large rate cut, the top 0.01 percent income share remains flat in the 1960s,
and well into the 1970s, suggesting little
behavioral response in both the short and the
long run. This stands in contrast to the sharp
response of the top 0.01 percent income
share to the 1981 and 1986 tax changes,
consistent with the view that the elasticity
is not an immutable parameter, but instead
depends on the tax system.
Second, figure 2 shows clearly that about
one-third of the response to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 from 1986 to 1988 was due to a
surge in S-corporation income.62 Partnership
62 The 1981 tax act also produced a sudden increase of
S-corporation income (which was negligible up to 1981),
which explains most of the increase in top incomes from
1981 to 1984 first documented by Lawrence B. Lindsey
(1987).
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Figure 2. The Top 0.01 Percent U.S. Income Share, Composition, and Marginal Tax Rate, 1960–2006
Source: Updated version of figure 8 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
The figure displays the income share of the top .01 percent tax units, and how the top .01 percent incomes are
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), S-corporation profits,
partnership profits, sole proprietorship profits, dividends, interest income, and other income. The figure also displays the average marginal tax rate (weighted by income) for the top 0.01 percent in a bold line on the right y-axis.

income also rose dramatically immediately
after 1986, mostly because of the disappearance of partnership losses. The sudden jump
in S-corporation income, exactly at the time
of the tax reform, strongly suggests that this
was the consequence of a one-time shift of
taxable income from the corporate sector,
and the one-time closing of the partnership
loss tax shelters (Slemrod 1996, Gordon and
Slemrod 2000). The surge in business income
reported on individual returns in the 1980s
thus cannot be interpreted as a “supply-side”
success, as most of those individual income
gains came either at the expense of taxable
corporate income, or were obtained from the
closing of tax shelters by imposing stricter
rules on losses from passive businesses.
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Third, figure 2 displays a dramatic shift in
the composition of very top incomes away
from dividends (which represented more than
60 percent of top incomes in the early 1960s)
toward wage income and S-corporation and
partnership income. In the early 1960s, when
the top 0.01 percent incomes were facing
marginal tax rates of about 80 percent on
average, tax rates on long-term capital gains
were around 25 percent. Thus, dividends
were a very disadvantaged form of income
for the rich, suggesting that those top income
earners had little control over the form of
payment, and thus might have been in large
part passive investors. The Kennedy tax cuts
apparently did not reduce the top individual
rate enough (the top rate became 70 percent)
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to make the S-corporation form attractive
relative to the C-corporation form, explaining
perhaps the contrast in behavioral responses
between the Kennedy tax cuts episodes and
the tax changes of the 1980s. Interestingly,
figure 2 also displays an increase in the dividend income component after 2003, when
the tax rate on dividend income was lowered
to 15 percent.63
Fourth, and related, the wage income
component of the top 0.01 percent has experienced a dramatic secular growth since
the 1970s. The wage component exhibits
clear spikes in 1988 and 1992, which are
likely to reflect short-term responses to the
tax changes due to retiming of compensation.64 The difficult question to resolve is to
what extent the secular growth in top wage
incomes was due to the dramatic decline in
top marginal tax rates since the 1960s. This
question cannot be resolved solely looking at
U.S. evidence. Evidence from other countries on the pattern of top incomes and top
tax rates (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011)
suggests that reducing top tax rates to levels below 50 percent is a necessary—but not
sufficient—condition to produce a surge in
top incomes. Countries such as the United
States or the United Kingdom have experienced both a dramatic reduction in top
tax rates and a surge in top incomes (Mike
Brewer, Saez, and Andrew Shephard 2010),
while other countries such as Japan have
also experienced significant declines in top
tax rates, but no comparable surge in top
incomes over recent decades (Moriguchi
and Saez 2008).

63 This is consistent with the firm-based analysis of
Chetty and Saez (2005), who show that dividends paid out
by publicly traded U.S. companies rose sharply after the
dividend tax cut was enacted.
64 There is also a very large spike in 2000 that is likely
due to the boom and bust in the dot-com sector, where
stock-option exercises, which generally generate income
classified as wages, peaked in 2000 before collapsing in
2001 and 2002.
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Overall, the compositional graph displayed on figure 2 casts significant light on
the anatomy of the behavioral response
and helps to distinguish short-term from
long-term effects, as well as effects due to
income shifting from the corporate base to
the individual base or due to tighter regulations regarding business losses. Therefore,
we believe that supplementing the focus on
the taxable income elasticity with a more
granular understanding of the various components of behavioral responses to taxation
is fruitful both to predict the effects of future
tax reforms as well as to analyze the overall
welfare and fiscal consequences of actual
tax changes. As this discussion has shown,
there is compelling evidence of substantial responses of upper income taxpayers to
changes in tax rates, at least in the short run.
However, in all cases, the response is either
due to short-term retiming or income shifting. There is no compelling evidence to date
of real responses of upper income taxpayers
to changes in tax rates.
Following the interpretation of Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez (2011) in their analysis of
the evolution of top income shares in the
long run, it is conceivable that the drop in
top marginal tax rates since the 1980s could
lead to more wealth and capital income concentration decades later, as top income individuals can accumulate wealth more easily
when top tax rates are lower. In this case, the
surge in the top income share due to capital income displayed in figure 2 could be the
long-term consequence of past top tax rate
cuts. The ETI has not yet developed a framework to analyze such long-term responses
through the savings and wealth accumulation channels.
4.

Empirical Analysis

Since the early 1990s, a large literature has
sought to estimate the ETI and elasticities
for related income measures. Most of this
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literature on the ETI has focused on individual taxable income in the United States,
although some studies have examined individual taxable income in Canada and Western
Europe. The analyses in the literature vary
widely in the extent to which they address—
or even attempt to address—the issues discussed in the previous section. Rather than
comprehensively survey this literature, in
what follows we selectively discuss the studies—focusing on studies that use the type of
data and empirical approaches most likely
to yield reliable estimates of the elasticity of
taxable income or of a broader measure of
income. We emphasize how, and how well,
each study addresses the methodological
issues discussed in the previous section.65

Feenberg and Poterba (1993) were the
first to use aggregate tax return data to shed
light on the high-income share of reported
aggregate income in the United States and
to what extent this might be influenced by
changes to the tax rate structure. They calculate for 1951 to 1990 the share of AGI
and several components of AGI that were
received by the top 0.5 percent of households
ranked by AGI. Consistent with figure 1, the
four-decade time series is sharply U-shaped,
beginning with a steady decline from over
8 percent in the early 1950s to just below 6
percent around 1970. Then, after remaining
roughly flat at about 6.0 percent from 1970
to 1981, the high-income share of income
begins in 1982 to continuously increase to
7.7 percent in 1985, then jumps sharply in
1986 to 9.2 percent. There is a slight increase
in 1987 to 9.5 percent, then another sharp
increase in 1988 to 12.1 percent. Although
they conduct no formal analysis of the d
 ataset

they construct, Feenberg and Poterba (1993)
argue that this time-series pattern is consistent with a behavioral response to the reductions in the top marginal tax rate, especially
during the Tax Reform Act of 1986 episode.
Slemrod (1996) uses high-income share
data for 1954 to 199066 to examine in a
regression framework the tax and nontax
causes of inequality. The data up to 1986 are
taken directly from Feenberg and Poterba
(1993), but the data from 1987 to 1990 are
adjusted to correspond to a pre-Tax Reform
Act of 1986 definition of AGI so as to get
closer to a consistent (or constant-law) definition over time. Dependent variables studied include the high-income share of AGI
and four components of income. Explanatory
variables in the regressions include measures
of the contemporaneous, one-year-lagged,
and one-year-leading top tax rates for both
ordinary individual income and long-term
capital gains. To control for exogenous, nontax-related, income trends, Slemrod includes
a measure of earnings inequality between
the 90th and 10th percentiles not based on
tax return data as well as macroeconomic
variables that might differentially influence
incomes across the income distribution (e.g.,
the real level of stock prices and the average nominal corporate AAA bond rate).
Regressions are estimated using data up to
1985 and then again using data up to 1990 to
investigate whether or not there was a break
in the structure of the model in 1986. The
analysis reveals that, up to 1985, changes in
the top tax rate on individual income play
almost no role in explaining the variation
in the high-income share of AGI; indeed,
more than two-fifths of the increase in highincome share between 1973 and 1985 can be
associated with the increase in 90–10 wage
inequality. However, when data up to 1990

65 The working paper version of this paper (Saez,
Slemrod, and Giertz 2009) contains a narrative description
of a wider set of studies.

66 Slemrod examines both the top 0.5 percent as well
as the top 1 percent of taxpayers, although all regressions
exclusively use the top 0.5 percent.

4.1 Analysis Using Aggregated Time-Series
Data
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are included in the regression, the coefficient on the top tax rate term becomes large
in absolute value and statistically significant.
After analyzing different components
of AGI, including wages and salaries,
Subchapter S income, and partnership
income, Slemrod (1996) concludes that the
regression results are likely driven by the
changes to the structure of the tax base instituted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This
new structure provided very different incentives and opportunities for high-income individuals to report income (and losses) via the
individual tax system. He cautions that the
results do not necessarily imply that taxpayer
responses to marginal tax rates, holding the
tax structure constant, were higher post1986. Instead the tax rate variables, which
changed dramatically at the same time the
structure changed, may be picking up some
of the effect of this structural change.67
Because of the simultaneity of the tax rate
changes and scores of tax base changes, the
high tax rate elasticity estimated over the
sample up to 1990 is not an unbiased estimate of the true elasticity, either before or
after the reform.
Saez (2004b) examines IRS data from
1960 to 2000. He regresses the log of average
income for the top 1 percent of the distribution on the log of the average net-of-tax rate
for the top 1 percent over the time period
and finds large elasticities, even when including time trends or instrumenting the log netof-tax rate using the statutory top marginal
tax rate. Saez (2004b) goes on to investigate
which categories of income drive the overall response, primarily to ascertain to what
extent the estimated ETIs reflect income
shifting. He, like Slemrod (1996), finds a
break in the series following the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. When he examines categories of
gross income, he finds that income shifting
67 Don Fullerton (1996), in a comment on Slemrod
(1996), emphasizes this interpretation.
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can explain most of the rise in Subchapter
S and partnership income. What remains
unclear is whether any portion of the post1986 wage and salary growth is attributable
to the decline in marginal tax rates, is simply another form of income shifting, or is the
consequence of non-tax-related widening of
the earnings distribution.
4.2 Analysis Using Panel Data
Feldstein (1995) pioneered the use of
panel data to estimate the ETI for the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 by using the U.S. public-use panel tax data (see Appendix B.1).
He groups taxpayers by their 1985 marginal
tax rates and uses a tabulated differencein-differences methodology to estimate
the ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Specifically, to compute elasticities, the difference in the percent change in taxable
income (in 1988, relative to adjusted 1985
income) between two groups is divided by the
difference in the percent change in the average net-of-tax-rate between the two groups.
This method generates large ETI estimates,
ranging from 1 to 3 in alternative specifications. Although based on a much smaller
sample (Feldstein’s top group included only
fifty-seven tax returns), the Feldstein (1995)
results apparently corroborated the conclusion of Feenberg and Poterba (1993) based
on observing the time-series of share-ofincome data that something extraordinary
had happened to the dispersion of taxable
income at the same time as the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
Subsequent research using panel data
addresses the econometric issues raised
earlier in this paper such as mean reversion or secular income trends. Auten and
Carroll (1999) address mean reversion and
attempt to control for divergence within the
income distribution by including control
variables for region and occupation. Auten
and Carroll adopt a two-stage least-squares
regression approach, regressing the change
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in constant-law (log) AGI68 between 1985
and 1989 against the change in the log of the
net-of-tax rate and a set of other exogenous
variables. They instrument for the change in
the net-of-tax rate by inflating adjusted 1985
incomes by the CPI to 1989 levels and then
applying 1989 law to these incomes, as discussed in section 3.4.2. When adding nontax factors that may have been correlated
with the rise in income inequality over this
period (such as age, age-squared, occupation, region, and—notably—1985 income),
they report an elasticity estimate of 0.55.
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) investigate
behavioral responses to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, using panel data from the 1983 and
1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
instead of income tax return data. Due to
data limitations, they study an income concept close to AGI rather than taxable income.
When using Feldstein’s (1995) approach,
they report tax elasticities for AGI from 1.76
to 1.99, similar to Feldstein’s taxable income
elasticity estimates. Moffitt and Wilhelm
then turn to a two-stage least-squares regression approach, employing several alternative
instruments for the change in the net-of-tax
rate, including education and measures of
illiquid assets, and conclude that those instruments that are successful in discriminating
between the high-income group and the
balance of the population yield tax elasticity
estimates that range from 0.35 to 0.97. Note
that these instruments for tax rates are not
available with individual tax return data. As
in Auten and Carroll (1999), such estimates
based on comparing only two years are sensitive to mean reversion. Indeed, when including 1983 AGI as a control for mean reversion,
their elasticities increase by between 0.3 and
0.5; recall that because the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 reduced top MTRs, mean reversion
68  The constant-law calculations are based on post-1986
law. They do a robustness test and find that using pre-1986
laws does not significantly change the results.
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(at the top of the income distribution) biases
downward estimated ETIs.
Interestingly, because SCF data include
labor supply measures (hours of work),
Moffitt and Wilhelm also estimate labor supply responses and conclude that the surge in
the taxable income of high-income individuals
between 1983 and 1989 was not accompanied
by an increase in reported hours of work. This
result of no response along a real economic
margin is fully consistent with the overall
conclusion that clearly visible responses are
generally due to retiming or avoidance, with
no compelling evidence of real economic
responses. It would certainly be valuable to
follow upon Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) and
systematically compare income reporting
responses to tax changes with real economic
responses such as labor supply or output.
Gruber and Saez (2002) use the publicuse version of the panel tax data for the
years 1979 to 1990 to examine both taxable
income and broad income responses to both
the 1981 tax change and the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Broad income is defined as income
before deductions. They measure behavioral changes (between paired observations)
over three-year intervals, which provides
them with variation in tax rates across time
for all income levels and a longer period for
behavioral responses to occur. Furthermore,
because they incorporate state as well as
federal income tax changes, they also have
cross-sectional variations in tax rate changes
within income groups.
Gruber and Saez devote much attention
to the issues of mean reversion and secular income trends, and separately estimate
income and substitution effects of the tax
change. They instrument for the change in the
net-of-tax rate using an instrument very similar to that used by Auten and Carroll (1999):
the change in the net-of-tax rate assuming
each filer’s income grows at the rate of overall nominal income growth between the base
and subsequent year. They also construct
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an analogous instrument for capturing the
income effect, the log change in after-tax
income assuming that base year income grows
at the same rate as total income. The second
stage regresses the log of (taxable or broad)
income growth against the change in the log
of the net-of-tax rate, year fixed effects, and
dummies for marital status. As they use multiple years simultaneously, they can include a
rich set of controls for base income.
Gruber and Saez’s elasticity estimate for
broad income, 0.12, is notably smaller than
their corresponding estimate for taxable
income, suggesting that much of the taxable
income response comes through deductions,
exemptions, and exclusions. Consistent with
this conclusion, they find that most of the
response in taxable income can be attributed
to itemizers (for itemizers, the elasticity is
0.65, whereas for non-itemizers, it is negative and insignificant). Although estimates by
income group are not statistically distinguishable from each other, they do vary greatly
and are generally higher for higher-income
taxpayers (0.57 for people with incomes
over $100,000, 0.11 for those from $50,000$100,000 and 0.18 for those with income
from $10,000 to $50,000). Importantly,
Gruber and Saez find much lower elasticities
for broad income than for taxable income.
Even for upper income earners, the elasticity of broad income is small (0.17). Those
findings suggest that the current tax system
creates significant efficiency costs because of
its many avoidance opportunities, but that a
broader income tax base might substantially
lower the efficiency costs of taxation and
increase the ability of the government to
raise taxes from the upper income groups.69
Kopczuk (2005) investigates the hypothesis
that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but

rather a function of the tax base (which he
defines as taxable income divided by total
income). The motivating idea is that available
deductions lower the cost of shifting income
outside the tax base. Therefore, as the tax base
narrows, the responsiveness to changes in tax
rates should increase. After first-differencing
(he uses three-year intervals, following the
methodology of Gruber and Saez 2002), he
follows a two-stage least-squares approach
with instruments for both the change in the
log net-of-tax rate and for the interaction of
that variable with the share of income that is
deductible. For instruments, he uses the log
of the predicted changes of these variables,
absent any behavioral response. Including
both instrumented changes in marginal tax
rates and an interaction term between the
change in tax rate and change in tax base, generates income-weighted elasticity estimates
(for married filers) of 0.12 with no deductions
and 1.06 for the deductible-share interaction
term. These estimates imply that the roughly
4.5 percentage point increase in Kopczuk’s
definition of the tax base as a result of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 would lower the ETI
by roughly 5 percentage points, from 0.25 to
0.20. Because itemizers’ deductible share of
income is much higher, the same estimated
coefficients would imply a pre-1986 ETI of
0.42 versus a post-1986 ETI of 0.36. Kopczuk
(2005) concludes that the results imply that
an individual who has no access to any deductions would not respond to changes in tax
rates (at least over a three-year interval). The
more deductions are available, the stronger
the response. This result is consistent with
Gruber and Saez’s finding that the behavioral
response is substantial for taxable income,
but much smaller for broad income.70

69 Note that even the 0.17 broad income elasticity might
include responses generating fiscal externalities such as
income shifting from the corporate to the personal income
base.

70 Another innovation to Gruber and Saez’s approach
made by Kopczuk (2005) is the inclusion of separate
variables to control for mean reversion and secular divergence in the income distribution.
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Giertz (2007) applies the methods of
Gruber and Saez (2002) to larger panel
data sets of tax returns from 1979 to 2001
available only within government agencies
(see appendix B.1). Using first the data
from the Continuous Work History Survey
which does not oversample higher income
earners, he shows that Gruber and Saez’s
approach yields an estimated ETI for the
1990s of 0.20—or about half the size of
the corresponding estimate for the 1980s.
However, when he uses broad income,
instead of taxable income, the estimated
elasticity is 0.15, as opposed to 0.12 for the
1980s. This significant difference between
the taxable income estimates and small difference between the broad income estimates is consistent with the results from
Kopczuk (2005) suggesting that the availability of deductions and exemptions matter in determining the ETI because the
fraction of taxpayers choosing to itemize
was approximately 25 percent lower in
1993 compared to 1986. Calculating the
ETI over the period 1979 to 2001, Giertz
obtains an estimate of 0.30.
This concludes our selective summary of
what is known about the value of the ETI. Of
note is that estimated values of the ETI for
the 1990s, identified largely off of the 1990
and 1993 tax changes, are generally lower
than those for the 1980s, identified largely
off of the 1981 and 1986 changes. There are
two broad, and not mutually exclusive, categories of explanations for this pattern of
results.
The first suggests there is no reason to
expect a universal parameter in the first
place. Leading proponents of this hypothesis
are Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), who argue
that the ETI is not a structural parameter
and is a function of not only preferences,
but also the breadth of the tax base and tax
enforcement parameters. Kopczuk (2005)

found empirical support for this hypothesis,
and Giertz (2007) found that the elasticity
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with respect to taxable income varies much
more by decade than the elasticity with
respect to broad income, supporting the
argument that changing rules for deductions
affects the taxable income elasticity.
The second category of explanations
points to methodological issues as the driving reason behind the differences between
decades. One such argument proposed by
Carroll (1998) and Giertz (2007), among others, suggests that (for at least some periods)
the model is unable to adequately control for
exogenous income trends. As a result, the rising, and non-tax-related, income inequality
trend could bias ETI estimates upward when
top tax rates fall and downward when they
rise. Another potential source of bias that
varies across periods could arise if the models fail to capture some potentially important
types of income shifting, such as the shifting between the corporate and individual
income tax base. Incentives for this type of
shifting were greater in the 1980s than in the
1990s.
Due to space limitations, we do not comprehensively review the substantial literature
estimating the ETI using data from countries
other than the United States.71 However,
some recent work using Danish data is worth
noting, largely because of the especially rich
longitudinal data available to researchers
that span over two decades and also include
a variety of demographic 
variables not
available on U.S. (or most other countries’)
tax returns.

71 Although see the working paper version of our paper,
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009), which does discuss this
literature. We reiterate that, for reasons discussed earlier,
there is no reason to expect that the ETI would be the same
across countries because it is a function not only of arguably relatively uniform aspects of preferences, but also of
the details of countries’ tax systems. Slemrod and Kopczuk
(2002) develop a model of the “optimal” elasticity of taxable income and show that it will be lower in countries with
more egalitarian social welfare functions and with a lower
cost of administering and enforcing a broad tax base.

2/27/12 3:49 PM

Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz: The Elasticity of Taxable Income
Kleven and Schultz (2011) use panel tax
return data since 1980 to analyze behavioral
responses to various income tax reforms over
the period 1984 to 2005 in Denmark using a
method similar to Gruber and Saez (2002).
Their study has three key advantages relative to U.S.-based studies. First, they can use
the full universe of Danish tax filers over a
long period, generating a very large longitudinal dataset that also contains detailed
socioeconomic information. Second, the

Danish income distribution has been very
stable over this period compared to the
U.S. distribution, making tax effects easier
to identify. Third, the Danish tax reforms
spanning 1984–2005 generated substantial
variation in tax rates that is not systematically
correlated with income, as different reforms
affected different brackets and consisted of
both rate increases and decreases for a given
bracket. Furthermore, many changes apply
only to specific income components as the
Danish tax system imposes different rates on
different income components. As a result,
they can control for a rich set of base-year
incomes. They find that (1) population-wide
elasticities are modest compared to most
existing studies, (2) elasticities for capital
income are larger than for labor income, (3)
elasticities for negative income (deductions,
negative capital income) are larger than for
positive income, (4) elasticities for the selfemployed are larger than for employees,
(5) elasticities are monotonically increasing
in income level and are two to three times
larger in the top quintile of the distribution
than in the bottom quintile of the distribution, and (6) income effects are very small.
Chetty et al. (2011) also use population tax
files from Denmark and estimate the ETI
using bunching evidence around kink points
where marginal tax rates jump, building upon
the method developed in Saez (2010) in the
U.S. case. They develop a new method of
estimating the long-run elasticity in an environment where adjustment costs attenuate
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short-run behavioral responses by comparing the short-run effects of small versus large
tax changes. Consistent with the existence
of large adjustment costs, the amount of
bunching they obtain is a highly convex function of the size of the change in the net-of-tax
rate at the kink. In other words, the implied
elasticity is larger from large changes in
marginal tax rates than for small changes in
marginal tax rates. The degree of bunching
varies across demographic groups and occupations in a manner that appears to be correlated with the flexibility of labor supply
and is much more pronounced for secondary earners and especially the self-employed.
Their results suggest that adjustment frictions create heterogeneity in the size of the
elasticity response in the short-run and that
such effects need to be taken into account to
obtain the long-run elasticity that is of most
interest for policy making.
5.

Conclusions and Future Work

5.1 What We Have Learned
Under certain assumptions, which in
the end we find unconvincing, all behavioral responses to income tax rate changes
are symptoms of inefficiency, and all such
responses are captured by the elasticity
of taxable income. This insight, raised in
Feldstein (1995, 1999), is central to tax policy analysis. Because of its centrality to the
evaluation of tax structure and because of
the growing availability of longitudinal tax
return data, much effort has been devoted to
identifying its magnitude.
Attracting even more attention was the
fact that the early empirical literature, focusing on the U.S. tax cuts of 1981 and particularly 1986, produced elasticity estimates
large enough to suggest that, not only was
the marginal efficiency cost of tax rates high,
but that the United States might be on the
wrong side of the Laffer curve. Subsequent
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research generated considerably lower estimates, in part because of better data and
improved methodology, but also because the
variety of tax rate changes after 1986 facilitated separating out the impact of tax rate
changes from non-tax-related changes in the
inequality of pretax income. While there are
no truly convincing estimates of the long-run
elasticity, the best available estimates range
from 0.12 to 0.40. Proceeding mechanically,
at the approximate midpoint of this rate—an
ETI of 0.25—the marginal excess burden
per dollar of federal income tax revenue
raised is $ 0.195 for an across-the-board
proportional tax increase, and $ 0.339 for a
tax increase focused on the top 1 percent of
income earners.72
Even at the top of this range the U.S.
marginal top rate is far from the top of the
Laffer curve. However, the elasticity of taxable income is higher than one would calculate if the sole behavioral response were
labor supply. There is also much evidence
to suggest that the ETI is higher for highincome individuals who have more access to
avoidance opportunities, especially deductible expenses.
The main attraction of the ETI concept—
that it is a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis and therefore one need not inquire into
the anatomy of behavioral response—has
proven to be overstated for two important
reasons.
First, the welfare relevance of the elasticity depends on the extent of fiscal externalities—whether taxable income is shifted to
or from another tax base, or to and from the

72 These calculations are based on 2005 tax return data;
details are available from the authors. Note that the ETI
for top earners could conceivably be higher than 0.25,
especially if the top tax rate is increased while keeping the
tax rate on realized capital gains constant hence fueling tax
avoidance opportunities. With an elasticity of 0.5 for the
top 1 percent income earners, the marginal excess burden
per dollar of revenue doubles to $ 0.678 for a tax increase
on top percentile income earners.
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same tax base at a different time. Moreover,
if classical externalities apply to oftendeductible items such as charitable contributions, the ETI must be adjusted for welfare
purposes. Examining which components
of taxable income respond to tax rates (the
“anatomy” of response) can help clarify the
extent of these externalities. This brings us
back to the pre-ETI attention to each of the
many margins of behavioral response to tax
rate changes.
Second, while there is compelling U.S.
evidence of strong behavioral responses to
taxation at the upper end of the distribution around the main tax reform episodes
since 1980, in all cases those responses fall
in the first two tiers of the Slemrod (1990,
1995) hierarchy—timing and avoidance. In
contrast, there is no compelling evidence
to date of real economic responses to tax
rates (the bottom tier in Slemrod’s hierarchy) at the top of the income distribution.
In the narrow perspective where the tax
system is given (and abstracting from fiscal and classical externalities), the type of
behavioral response is irrelevant. However,
in the broader perspective where changes
in the tax system such as broadening the tax
base, eliminating avoidance opportunities,
or strengthening enforcement are possible
options, the type of behavioral response
becomes crucial. While such policy options
may have little impact on real responses
to tax rates (such as labor supply or saving
behavior), they can have a major impact on
responses to tax rates along the avoidance or
evasion channels. In other words, if behavioral responses to taxation are large in the
current tax system, the best policy response
would not be to lower tax rates, but instead
to broaden the tax base and eliminate avoidance opportunities to lower the size of
behavioral responses. Those findings also
highlight the importance of the fact that the
ETI is not an immutable parameter, but can
be influenced by government policies. For
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this reason, it is likely to vary across countries and within countries over time when
non-rate aspects of tax systems change.
The empirical methods are most convincing in estimating the short-term response to
tax rate changes, and in that case one must
be careful to distinguish the response to
anticipated versus unanticipated changes.
Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income
in the long run (i.e., exceeding a few years)
are plagued by extremely difficult issues of
identification, so difficult that we believe that
there are no convincing estimates of the longrun elasticity of reported taxable income to
changes in the marginal tax rate.73 Analysis
of panel data does not seem likely to resolve
the identification issues raised by trends in
income inequality and mean reversion at the
top and bottom ends of the income distribution. Repeated cross-section analysis based
on longer time series is very useful to analyze
changes in the share of income accruing to
various income groups and to assess whether
those changes are systematically related to
changes in marginal tax rates. However, evidence from a single country is in general not
enough to conclusively estimate behavioral
elasticities because many factors besides tax
rate shape the income distribution. Timeseries share analysis, coupled with compositional analysis, can be useful to detect
large short-term changes due to behavioral
responses.
5.2 What We Need to Learn
First, future research that attempts to
quantify the welfare cost of higher tax rates
should attempt to measure the components
of behavioral responses as well as their sum.
It needs to be more attentive to the extent
to which the behavioral response reflects
shifting to other bases and the extent to

73  Many of these problems are not unique to identifying
the long-run ETI, but apply to the estimation of all behavioral responses.
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which the behavioral response comes from
margins with substantial externalities.
Second, empirical analyses should look
more systematically at non-U.S. experience to potentially validate the conclusions
based on U.S. experience and to sharpen our
understanding of how the environment, writ
large, affects the ETI. As discussed above,
this line of research is already under way
and indeed the most promising and innovative recent studies on the ETI have been
based on non-U.S. data. Part of the reason
is that several OECD countries, especially
in Scandinavia, are now making individuallevel tax data, often linked with demographic
information, much more widely available for
research purposes than is the United States.
This trend is likely to continue unless the
United States broadens access to population
tax return data.
Third, researchers should be seeking better sources of identification; for example,
parallel income tax systems that differentially affect taxpayers over a long period of
time. Conceivably, field experiments could
be designed where individuals are randomly
assigned to different tax schedules in the
spirit of the older negative income tax experiments in the United States.74
Fourth, researchers should be sensitive
to the possibility that nonstandard aspects
of tax systems and the behavioral response
to them—such as salience, information,
popular support, and asymmetric response
to increases versus decreases—might affect
the size of behavioral response. The recent
approach of Chetty (2009a) is particularly
promising. His meta-analysis, which includes
most ETI studies, shows that d
 iscrepancies
across estimates could be explained by
imperfect optimization and frictions such as
adjustment costs. In that context, large and
salient changes in tax rates provide much

74 See

Munnell (1987).
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more informative estimates of the long-run
ETI than small or non-salient changes.
Finally and related, the ETI literature
could be fruitfully connected to the macroeconomic literature along two dimensions.
First, a number of recent macroeconomic
studies have estimated the effects of taxes
on labor supply using cross-country analysis.
Instead of considering only aggregate labor
supply, it could be possible to carry out an
analysis by income groups to sharpen the
identification and capture a broader set of
behavioral responses. Second, as we have
pointed out, tax rates can have long-term
effects on reported capital incomes through
saving and wealth accumulation channels. Estimating such effects would naturally require the development of a dynamic
framework as in the macroeconomic savings
literature.
Appendix
A.

Recent Legislated Tax Changes
in the United States

In this appendix section, we briefly outline the major changes in the U.S. individual
income tax since the mid 1950s. Table A1
reports the top statutory marginal federal
income tax rates on (1) ordinary individual
income, (2) earned income, (3) long-term
realized capital gains, as well as the corporate
tax rate since 1952. The table also describes
briefly the most important additional provisions affecting high-income tax rates.
Although Congress regularly amends the
tax code, only occasionally does it make
major reforms. The 1954 Internal Revenue
Code represented an important and fundamental reform to the U.S. tax system. The
1954 Code created twenty-four tax brackets
with marginal tax rates increasing with
income from 20 to 91 percent, but with a
maximum tax rate of 25 percent applied to
capital gains; the top corporate tax rate was
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52 percent. (While the 1954 act represented
a fundamental change to the U.S. tax system, it did not alter MTRs on top incomes.)
The 1954 Code was amended many times,
but remained in place until 1986. The 1960s
saw a couple of important tax changes. One
was the Revenue Act of 1964, inspired by
President John Kennedy, but enacted under
President Lyndon Johnson. This act reduced
individual and corporate tax rates, notably
lowering the top marginal income tax rate
from 91 percent to 70 percent. The Tax
Reform Act of 1969 introduced a new rate
schedule. While the top individual income
tax rate remained at 70 percent, the top rate
on earned income was lowered (over the
next few years) to 50 percent.75 The 1970s
saw federal tax revenues (and effective marginal tax rates) increase as a result of “bracket
creep” brought on by the combination of
unusually high inflation and tax brackets not
indexed for inflation. In response to this, a
series of tax acts were passed, most of which
lowered tax revenues by increasing allowable
tax deductions and credits.
Congress has changed federal marginal tax
rates several times since 1980. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the top
rate from 70 percent to 50 percent, and lowered all other tax rates in three annual steps
by a total of about 23 percent (not 23 percentage points). The Tax Reform Act of 1986
represented the most comprehensive tax
reform since 1954. It dropped the top marginal tax rate to 28 percent in two steps from
1986 to 1988, and made smaller cuts across
the income distribution. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 also eliminated the exclusion of
60 percent of long-term capital gains, lowered the corporate tax rate from 46 percent
to 34 percent, and contained scores of other

75 The 1969 act also extended a 5 percent income tax
surcharge. Additionally, it established both the individual
and corporate Alternative Minimum Tax.
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Table A1

Top Federal Marginal Tax Rates
Ordinary income

Earned income

Capital gains

Corporate income

Year

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1952–1963
1964
1965–1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972–1975
1976–1978
1979–1980
1981
1982–1986
1987
1988–1990
1991–1992
1993
1994–1996
1997–2000
2001
2002
2003–2009

91.0
77.0
70.0
75.3
77.0
71.8
70.0
70.0
70.0
70.0
68.8
50.0
38.5
28.0
31.0
39.6
39.6
39.6
39.1
38.6
35.0

91.0
77.0
70.0
75.3
77.0
71.8
60.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
38.5
28.0
31.0
39.6
42.5
42.5
42.0
41.5
37.9

25.0
25.0
25.0
26.9
27.9
32.3
34.3
36.5
39.9
28.0
23.7
20.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
15.0

52
50
48
53
53
49
48
48
48
46
46
46
40
34
34
35
35
35
35
35
35

Notes: MTRs apply to top incomes. In some instances, lower income taxpayers may face higher MTRs because of
income caps on payroll taxes or the so-called 33 percent “bubble” bracket following TRA 86. From 1952 to 1962, a
87 percent maximum average tax rate provision made the top marginal tax rate 87 percent instead of 91 percent for
many very top income earners. From 1968 to 1970, rates include surtaxes. For earned income, MTRs include the
Health Insurance portion of the payroll tax beginning with year 1994. Rates exclude the effect of phaseouts, which
effectively raise top MTRs for many high-income filers. MTRs on realized “long-term” capital gains are adjusted to
reflect that, for some years, a fraction of realized gains were excluded from taxation. Since 2003, dividends are also
tax favored with a maximum tax rate of 15 percent.

 rovisions several of which reduced deducp
tions and tax sheltering opportunities.
The tax changes of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 were
smaller and more focused on high-income
filers than those of the 1980s. The 1990 tax
change increased the top tax rate from 28
to 31 percent. The 1993 tax change further
increased the top rate from 31 to 36 percent
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and applied this rate to individuals with lower
incomes. It also created a new top marginal
tax rate of 39.6 percent by legislating a 10 percent surtax. Top tax rates on earned income
increased by roughly another 2.9 percentage
points because the cap on income subject to
the Medicare portion of the payroll tax was
lifted. Unlike the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the 1990 and 1993 tax changes incorporated
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only very few additional changes to the tax
code. Also in the 1990s, the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 substantially lowered capital
gains tax rates, among other things. This act
did not change tax rates on earned income
other than capital gains.
Tax rates have also changed since 2000.
In 2001, the Economic Growth Tax Relief
and Reconciliation Act lowered marginal tax
rates, reduced the number of tax brackets
and expanded allowable credits and deductions. Different aspects of the 2001 tax
change were scheduled to phase in over a
number of years, with the act expiring completely in 2011. In 2003, the Jobs Growth
Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act accelerated all of the marginal rate cuts from the
2001 tax change that were not set to fully
phase-in until 2006. Additionally, it substantially lowered tax rates on capital gains
and dividends down to 15 percent. These
changes will also expire in 2011, absent
action by Congress.
Before proceeding, note that, as a practical
matter, a number of studies in the empirical
literature (as well as the empirical exercise
in section 3) examine adjusted gross income
(AGI) in place of taxable income. Taxable
income equals AGI minus the value of personal exemptions and either the standard or
itemized deductions. Many data sets do not
include enough information to calculate taxable income in a consistent way over many
years. This is especially true for data sets spanning many decades, over which the definition of taxable income changes substantially.
Creating a constant-law income measure (see
the previous section) often requires information that is not reported, and therefore not
available to researchers, in many years. Many
taxable income responses are also captured
in AGI; however, changes in itemized deductions are not observed. Also, recall from
section 2 that the potential for positive externalities associated with some itemized deductions could argue for examining responses to
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AGI—even when good measures of taxable
income are available.
B.

Tax Return Data

As discussed in the paper, the estimation
of behavioral responses of reported income
to tax changes relies critically on the availability of high-quality individual income tax
data. In this appendix section, we discuss
briefly data availability in the United States
and we describe in more detail the data we
used in section 3.4.
B.1 U.S. Tax Return Data
The Statistics of Income (SOI) division at
the Internal Revenue Service has created
large annual micro-datasets of individual tax
returns since 1960. The SOI data are stratified random samples of about 250,000 tax
returns and include most of the information reported on the filers’ tax returns, plus
some additional demographic information.
Sampling rates vary by income (and other tax
return characteristics). The SOI heavily over
samples high-income filers with 100 percent
sampling rates at the top of the distribution,
a key advantage as top incomes play a critical role in determining overall responses to
changes in tax rates.
Sampling into the SOI data is based on (a
random transformation of) Social Security
numbers of tax filers. These assigned numbers do not change from year to year, and
beginning with year 1979, enable researchers to link SOI annual cross sections into a
panel dataset. (For more detail on the SOI
data and the SOI’s sampling strategy, see the
discussion below on the data used in section
3.) In particular, a core set of five last four
digits of the Social Security numbers are
always sampled and hence are a pure longitudinal sample of 0.05 percent of U.S. tax
returns. This core longitudinal sample within
the SOI data is called the Continuous Work
History Sample (CWHS).
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In several cases, SOI has supplemented
the core SOI cross sections by creating
additional panel data drawing from the full
population of individual tax returns. One
such example is the Treasury’s Family Panel,
which is a stratified random sample of tax filers followed from 1987 to 1996. The Family
Panel begins with 88,000 tax returns in 1987,
follows filers and their dependents through
1996 and includes “refreshments” to remain
representative of the overall filing population. Treasury’s 1999 Edited Panel, which
begins in 1999, is designed similarly to the
Family Panel. It currently runs through
2005. Another example is the Sales of Capital
Assets Panel, which follows a sample of tax
filers reporting sales of capital assets (on
Schedule D of IRS Form 1040).
SOI has released to the public the socalled “Public Use File” (PUF) version of
the SOI annual cross sections. To protect the
identity of taxpayers, those public use files
have a lower sampling rate at the very top
(1/3 instead of 1) and they also blur some
variables for very high incomes by combining several tax returns together. The PUF
contain about 100,000 tax returns per year.
However, the PUF do not contain longitudinal identifiers and hence cannot be linked
into panel data. Another important limitation of the PUF is that they do not report
separately income items of each spouse in
the case of married joint filers, limiting the
ability to measure the important secondary
earner response to tax changes.76
A public-use version of the CWHS
was also made public for years 1979 to
1990. The public version of the panel also
included some “blurring” of information
to protect the identity of taxpayers. The
public-use version of the CWHS goes by
various names, including the “University of
76 The SOI files can be merged within SOI to individual wage income information to obtain the breakdown of
income by spouse.
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Michigan Tax Panel” or “NBER Tax Panel.”
The absence of publicly available U.S.
panel data since 1990 has severely limited
the ability of academic researchers to study
more recent tax changes. As a result, most
of the recent studies have been carried out
by researchers within government agencies
(in a few cases in collaboration with outside
academics).
Due to improvements in information technology, it has now become feasible for SOI
to use the complete population files of tax
returns, i.e., about 140 million tax returns
each year. Those samples can of course be
linked longitudinally. The extremely large
size of the population files could be used to
broaden the scope of tax changes that can be
analyzed. Indeed, the United States offers
very rich variation at the state level. Most
existing data samples are too small to analyze
convincingly local changes. The availability
of population files for research use could
spur new work on responses to tax changes.
B.2 Tax Return Data Used in Section 3
The panel of individual tax returns used in
section 3 are from the Statistics of Income
(SOI) and spans years 1991 to 1997. Marginal
tax rates are imputed using Congressional
Budget Office’s federal tax model. Income,
denoted zit, is a constant-law measure of
AGI (adjusted gross income for individual i
at time t), excluding capital gains and including all Social Security benefits, such that
zit  = reportedAGI − realizedCG + nontaxableSSbenefits + deductedmovingexpenses.
Dollar values are adjusted by the IRS’s
inflation adjustment factors, using 1991 as
the base. Marginal tax rates are imputed
for only the federal income tax using the
Congressional Budget Office’s internal tax
calculators. The rate imputations exclude
changes to the payroll tax (which only applies
to earned income) and to changes to state tax
rates. While this leaves an incomplete measure of the marginal tax rate, it has the virtue
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of simplicity. Because of the stratification
structure of the SOI panel, (paired) observations are weighted by the reciprocal of
their probability of appearing in the sample
as done by Auten and Carroll (1999) and by
subsequent researchers working with the
SOI panel.
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